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ABSTRACT
This is dissertation consists of three studies investigating accountability in auditing. It is
aimed at gaining a better understanding of how auditors make decision in the presence of
accountability pressure.
The first study is a literature review of the experimental audit research on accountability.
It provides a conceptual framework for organizing prior research on this topic and offers
opportunities for future research. Several areas are in need of continued research. Limited
research has considered how auditors respond to multiple accountability pressures. However,
research on multiple accountability pressures is particularly important given the somewhat
unique environment in which auditors work. They face accountability pressures from a number
of sources- clients, regulators, shareholders, supervisors, etc. Additional research looking at the
impact of process and outcome accountability is also needed. Very little research has considered
how auditors are influenced by these two different types of accountability pressure. However,
theory would suggest they may have a dramatically different influence on auditors’ decision
making processes.
The second study experimentally investigates accountability as a potential mitigating
mechanism for the performance declines caused by ego depletion. Auditors are shown to be
susceptible to depletion, but research has yet to consider how a natural element of the audit
environment, accountability, influences the relationship between depletion and performance.
Surprisingly, the results of this study suggest that depletion doesn’t necessarily hinder
performance, but can actually improve performance in certain circumstances. Furthermore, those
individuals who were accountable did not perform significantly different based on whether they

iii

were depleted or not. The findings suggest both accountability and depletion improve auditor
performance. However, when both elements are combined, they do not significantly improve
performance beyond the performance improvements seen when either accountability or depletion
are present.
Study three examines how auditors respond to multiple accountability pressures. It
considers how a power level difference between two conflicting parties, as well as a variation in
justification timing, impact auditors’ decisions. The findings suggest that auditors align their
decisions with the preferences of the more powerful party when there is a large power
differential between conflicting parties. However, when the power differential is small, auditors
employ a more integratively complex decision making process allowing them to reach a
conclusion that they can defend. Justification timing is also shown to influence auditors’
decisions, but not in the manner expected. Surprisingly, the results indicate that auditors tend to
more closely align their decisions with the preferences of the last person to whom they must
justify their decisions, as to opposed to the first person.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of accountability in three
distinct ways. It synthesizes prior research to provide insight into what we have learned thus far
and where we should go from here in terms of research. It then considers whether accountability
mitigates the negative effects of ego depletion, where it finds that depletion actually improves,
rather than hinders, performance. Thus, suggesting auditors aren’t always negatively impacted by
depletion. Lastly, it provides insight into how auditors make decisions in the presence of multiple
accountability pressures. A very important, yet dramatically under-researched area in auditing.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three studies investigating accountability in auditing. These three
studies focus on extending our understanding of the influence that accountability has on auditor
judgment and decision making.
Accountability represents the expectation that one will be called upon to justify their
decisions to some evaluative audience (i.e., accountability source). In the auditing environment,
accountability mechanisms are formally implemented through the audit review process, the peer
review process, and the PCAOB review process. However, auditors also face accountability
pressure from other parties, including clients, banks, and investors (e.g. Gibbins and Newton
1994). As Lerner and Tetlock (1999, p. 270) note, “People do not think and act in a social
vacuum.” As such, it is important to consider how the features of one’s environment influences
the way in which they make decisions.
Examining accountability in an audit setting is important for two reasons. First, auditing
standards require auditors to remain skeptical throughout the audit process and be objective in
evidence evaluation (PCAOB 2015). Auditors frequently face situations where significant
judgment is required and decisions have no clear right or wrong answer. Objectivity is
particularly important in these instances. To the extent that accountability pressures influence
auditors’ judgment and decision making processes, precautions should be taken to limit these
influences. A thorough understanding of the effects that these accountability pressures have
allows firms to restructure their formal accountability mechanisms in ways that maximize auditor
objectivity, or to implement additional procedures to mitigate these effects.
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Second, the auditing environment is somewhat unique, in that auditors face multiple
accountability pressures that must be managed simultaneously (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994).
Furthermore, the individuals to whom auditors are accountable may have differing preferences
regarding the decision that the auditors are required to make. Many organizational employees
experience accountability pressure, often through a formal review process; however, few face the
multiple accountability pressures that auditors do.
This dissertation organizes and synthesizes prior research on accountability in auditing to
help further research in this area. It also experimentally investigates accountability’s influence on
auditors’ judgments and decisions. Study one provides a framework for organizing and
synthesizing approximately 25 years of experimental audit research on accountability. It provides
a discussion of the literature based on this framework and offers suggestions for future research.
Study two evaluates the ability of accountability pressure to offset performance declines
associated with ego depletion, and the third study investigates auditor decision making under
multiple accountability pressures. The following three sections describes each study in more
detail, while the final section provides the overall contribution of this dissertation.

Study One: A Literature Review of Experimental Audit Research on Accountability
Study one provides a review and synthesis of experimental audit research on
accountability. The discussion of prior literature is based on an organizing framework that was
developed by identifying key factors that emerged upon review of the literature. This study
provides a holistic look at the literature on accountability and offers opportunities for future
research. The results indicate research focused on auditors’ responses to multiple accountability
is limited. This is a particularly important area of research given the accountability pressures
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present in the audit work environment. Additional research examining the influence of
accountability type on decision making is also needed. Overall, the research generally finds
results consistent with the Tetlock’s social contingency model of accountability (Tetlock 1992;
Tetlock and Lerner 1999). However, there are instances in which findings appear to diverge from
theory; this can be contributed to unique elements of the audit environment. Future research
should continue to not only consider how auditors respond to accountability pressure, but
investigate environmental elements the affect auditors’ perceptions or feelings of accountability.

Study Two: Ego Depletion and Auditor Performance: The Moderating Effect of Accountability
Prior research suggests that auditors are susceptible to the detrimental effects of ego
depletion. Ego depletion represents an exhaustion of mental resources that allows individuals to
exercise self-control. This study draws on accountability theory (Tetlock 1992) and the strength
model of ego depletion (Baumeister et al. 1998) to investigate whether accountability, an
inherent element in the auditing environment, can mitigate the impact that ego depletion has on
performance. Surprisingly, the results suggest that depletion does not necessarily hinder
performance, but can improve performance in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the
performance of individuals who are accountable does not differ significantly based on whether
they are depleted or not. This suggests that accountability improves the performance of
individuals who are not depleted, but the performance levels of those who are depleted does not
significantly differ based on the presence of accountability.
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Study Three: Auditor Judgment in a Multiple Accounting Setting: The Effects of Power Level
and Justification Timing
The third study investigates how auditors operate in a multiple accountability setting.
Specifically, this study experimentally investigates how a power differential between conflicting
parties (i.e. audit supervisor and client contact) and a difference in justification timing impact
auditor decision-making. Drawing on accountability theory (Tetlock 1999) and construal level
theory (Liberman and Trope 1998), auditors’ decisions are expected to differ based on whether
the accountability sources are of relatively equal power, or there is a significant difference in
power level between the two parties. Furthermore, the timing of the justification (i.e., whether
the auditors’ must immediately justify their decisions to an accountability source or justify their
decisions at some point in the future) is expected to influence auditors’ decisions. Consistent
with expectations, the results of this study indicate that auditors’ decisions vary depending upon
whether a power difference exists between accountability sources. Auditors more closely align
their decisions with the preferences of the more powerful party when there is a difference in
power level between the two sources. Unexpectedly, however, auditors align their decisions with
the preferences of the party to whom they must justify their decisions at some point in the future,
as opposed to aligning their decisions with the preferences of the party to whom they must
immediately justify their decisions. This finding is inconsistent with expectations based on
construal level theory. Overall, this study adds to our understanding of the influence that a power
differential has on auditor decision making. Additional research is needed to further investigate
the effect that justification timing has on auditor decision making.

4

Overall Contribution
Overall, this dissertation makes several contributions. It contributes to research in three
distinct ways. The synthesis of prior audit research on accountability provides insight into what
has been learned and highlights opportunities for future research. This contributes to research
beyond the findings of a single study. It provides a holistic view of the literature with a goal of
motivating others to conduct research on accountability, thereby extending the entire stream of
research. Studies two and three experimentally investigate auditors’ responses to accountability
pressure. Study two evaluates whether accountability pressure can overcome the performance
declines attributable to ego depletion. This study specifically extends research that investigates
whether accountability moderates the effect of various factors found to influence auditor
performance. Study three provides insight into how auditors make decisions given multiple
accountability pressures. Research on multiple accountability pressures is limited. This study
contributes to the literature in this area by investigating how auditors’ judgment and decision
making processes are affected by multiple accountability pressures. The results suggest both a
power differential between accountability sources and a variation in justification timing
influence auditor decision making.
The findings from this dissertation add to our understanding of accountability and, in
conjunction with prior literature, provide useful information for firms and regulators. Knowledge
of specific factors associated with accountability relationships that result in decreased auditor
effort and biased decision making will allow firms to manage these effects. Overall, this
information will help them to better understand the impact of accountability in order to structure
or implement accountability mechanisms in ways that maximize auditor objectivity, thus
improving overall audit quality.
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STUDY ONE: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL AUDIT
LITERATURE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
I. Introduction
Accountability pressure is an inherent element of the audit environment. This pressure
represents the requirement of auditors to justify their decisions to individuals in positions to
evaluate their work (Tetlock 1992). They must manage multiple accountability pressures
simultaneously on a day to day basis, as auditors are constantly making decisions that must be
justified to a variety of parties, including superiors, clients, regulators, and financial statement
users (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994). Research on accountability shows accountability pressure
affects auditors’ judgment and decision making processes by influencing auditors’ level of
cognitive effort and extent of work (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; DeZoort et al. 2006; Tan et al. 1997),
as well as their decision outcomes (e.g. Buchman et al. 1996; Lord 1992), decision
characteristics (e.g. Ashton 1992; Johnson and Kaplan 1991), and performance (e.g. Asare et al.
2000; Tan and Kao 1999), and ultimately the outcome of the audit process.
This paper is designed to provide an overview of the experimental auditing research on
accountability. A review and synthesis of approximately 25 years of research in the area will
provide a holistic overview of what has been learned about accountability in auditing. It will
also provide insight as to where further research is necessary to help expand our understanding
of the topic. This study presents a framework for organizing prior experimental research on
accountability in auditing. The framework is a mechanism for discussing and synthesizing the
research in this area.
The importance of investigating the effects of accountability on auditor decision making
is two-fold. First, the extent of accountability pressure in the auditing environment is somewhat
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unique. Auditors simultaneously manage accountability pressure from multiple sources. While
many organizational employees are accountable to their supervisors through a formal review
process, employee decisions generally are not subject to evaluation by regulators, clients, and the
investing public. Auditors’ decisions, however, are subject to evaluation by these parties.
Furthermore, the multiple parties often have differing preferences regarding the decisions
auditors must make. Due to the pervasiveness of accountability in auditing, it is extremely
important to understand how these pressures effect auditor decision making.
Second, the auditing standards require auditors to exercise professional skepticism, which
includes an objective evaluation of audit evidence (PCAOB 2015). As such, it is important to
understand the manner and extent to which auditors’ decisions are influenced by accountability
pressure. If accountability pressure inadvertently biases auditors’ decision making processes,
knowledge of such effects allow firms and regulators to implement mitigating mechanisms.
Conversely, if accountability pressure improves auditor decision making in certain
circumstances, firms can structure accountability mechanisms in a way that optimizes auditor
objectivity.
This paper is structured as follows: Accountability theory from social psychology is
discussed briefly to provide a general understanding of how it is applied in the auditing literature.
Second, a discussion of the manuscript selection process and a framework for organizing the
research is provided. The third section provides a discussion of the accountability literature
organized based on the provided framework. Last, an overall conclusion is presented with
opportunities for future research.
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II. Underlying Theoretical Motivation for Accountability Research in Auditing
Given that accounting is a domain of applied research, the auditing literature on
accountability often draws on theoretical models from social psychology. These theories inform
expectations regarding auditor behavior in a profession where accountability is a central element
of the work environment. Prior research recognizes work by Tetlock and colleagues as being the
most influential in the accountability literature (Hall et al. 2015). Tetlock’s social contingency
model is also widely used in the experimental auditing literature on accountability.
Tetlock’s social contingency model conceptualizes accountability based on the notion of
individuals as politicians. Accountability is commonly defined in accounting research as “…the
implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings or
actions to others.” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255). Individuals select the course of action most
likely to please important, evaluative others. The model predicts response strategies to
accountability pressure (e.g. acceptability heuristic, preemptive self-criticism,) given various
situational factors (e.g. views1 are known or unknown, process accountability vs. outcome
accountability) (Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Tetlock 1992). Tetlock argues that decisions are not
made in a “social vacuum”, and researchers must consider the social context when evaluating
individual cognitive processes (Tetlock 1992, 335). He contends that accountability can affect
how individuals think, not just what they say they think and suggests external factors alter
individual cognitive processing (Tetlock and Lerner 1999).
Barry Schlenker offers an alternative model of accountability called the pyramid model
of accountability (Schlenker 1990), which is also referenced in the accounting literature but is

1

The term “preferences” is also used to indicates the views of an accountability source.
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not as widely cited as Tetlock’s work. The pyramid model is not incompatible with Tetlock’s
social contingency model, but rather it provides a different conceptualization of accountability.
The pyramid model considers the way in which certain elements of the accountability setting
influence an individual’s response. This differs from Tetlock’s model which focuses on the way
in which individuals cope and respond to accountability pressure. Schlenker’s model considers
how the environment influences an individual’s response, while Tetlock’s model focuses on how
individuals respond to their environment (Hall et al. 2015).
Accounting research generally supports Tetlock’s social contingency model. Studies
show that accountability improves auditor effort and auditor performance in situations where the
preferences of an accountability source are unknown. When the preferences of an accountability
source are known (or can be inferred), research shows that effort is diminished and auditors
simply align their decision with the preferences of the source to whom they are accountable.
However, findings appear to deviate from the social contingency model in one situation. Known
preferences do not always have detrimental effects on auditor effort and auditor decision
outcomes. When known preferences are associated with effectively executing the audit process,
auditor effort increases, highlighting an instance when accountability to a party with known
views is beneficial. This difference is likely due to the auditing context to which the theory is
applied. The social contingency model does not differentiate between preference types and
propose different outcomes based on the nature of an accountability source’s preferences. In
social psychology, these preferences generally relate to preferred decision outcome. However,
the nature of auditing is such that known views can relate to preferences for a certain decision
outcome, or preferences related to the execution of the audit. Understandably, the theory is not
specific enough to capture every environmental characteristic which may cause a departure from
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theoretical expectation. This further highlights the importance of studying accountability in an
audit setting.

III. Organizing Framework for Accountability Research in Auditing
This literature review is focused on examining experimental audit research related to
accountability. Relevant research was initially identified through a Google Scholar search and
the American Accounting Association website search mechanism. Four key search terms were
utilized to identify applicable manuscripts with no constraints related to journal or time-period.2
The first 150 manuscripts in Google Scholar were reviewed for inclusion in this literature
review, as well as all 23 manuscripts identified on American Accounting Association website.
Studies set in an audit context with a clear focus on accountability were included.3 Additional
studies identified during the vetting process that appeared relevant to this literature review were
also included. This body of research was then used to establish an organizing framework for
accountability research in auditing. Figure 1 presents the resulting model.

The terms utilized were “auditing”, “accountability”, “experiment”, and “Tetlock”. These search terms were
selected in order to provide the most results relevant to the scope of this literature review. There is additional
research on accountability in auditing that offers a different perspective on accountability (e.g. Roberts 1991).
However, it is not captured here as this review focuses on experimental research.
3
Research utilizing accountability theory as theoretical support, but not directly focused on investigating the effect
of accountability pressure or individuals’ feelings of accountability, were excluded from this study (e.g. Cohen et al.
2013).
2
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Accountability Literature in Auditing
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Early research on accountability in auditing focuses on investigating whether
accountability pressure impacts auditor decision making. Most studies manipulate accountability
(the independent variable) as either present or absent, while one study manipulates the amount of
pressure (high vs. low). These manipulations often include information regarding whether the
person to whom the auditor is accountable (i.e. accountability source) has or has not expressed a
preference for a particular outcome, whether the preference of the accountability source is
similar or dissimilar to that of the auditor, whether the auditor knows the preference of the
accountability source before or after making their initial decision, or whether the auditor knows
they are accountable for their decision before or after evaluating the audit evidence. Individuals
often respond differently to accountability pressure when they have knowledge of the
accountability source’s preferences compared to when they do not. More recently, however,
research considers how different types of accountability pressure (process vs. outcome) and
various sources of pressure (single vs. multiple persons to whom auditors are accountable) affect
auditors.
While examining the impact of accountability on auditor judgment and decision making,
the dependent variables of interest vary, but they can be bifurcated into two broad categoriesauditor inputs and auditor outputs associated with a decision outcome. Auditor inputs represent
factors related to the way in which auditors work to reach a conclusion, as well the amount of
work auditors are willing to put forth. Specifically, researchers evaluate the influence that
accountability has on auditor effort, and auditor evidence evaluation and testing strategies.
Auditor outputs represent the actual conclusions the auditors reach. Researchers analyze these
variables differently, however the dependent variables of interest can be grouped into three
categories- the auditors’ decisions, the auditors’ performance, and the decision characteristics.
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Auditor decisions represent those outcomes for which there is no right or wrong answer.4 These
decisions are often evaluated relative to the preference of an accountability source in order to
draw inferences regarding the source’s influence. Auditor performance, on the other hand, is
related to auditor decisions but suggests some level of quality- an assessment of whether those
decisions are “good” or “bad”. Often, performance is evaluated based on the correctness or
accuracy of the decision. Lastly, decision characteristics reflect an overall evaluation of
participants’ decisions relative to another treatment or control group. Decision characteristics
related to decision consensus, consistency, and conservatism. Consensus suggests less variability
amongst participants’ responses, while consistency indicates similar decisions are made in a
similar manner. Conservatism relates to the aggressiveness of the participants’ decisions.
Researchers also recognize that various task and individual characteristics strengthen or
weaken (moderate) the relationship between accountability and outcome variables.
Characteristics of the task or the decision environment moderate the relationship between
accountability and the dependent variable of interest. The primary moderators that have been
examined include use of a decision aid, auditor attributes, task characteristics, and client
integrity.
Other research takes a different focus and examines accountability as a moderator. Prior
research shows that factors such as heuristics and biases impact auditors’ decisions. In an effort
to ascertain whether it is possible to mitigate the impact of those factors, researchers have
investigated the moderating effect of accountability. That research examines the ability of

The term “decisions” rather than “judgments” is utilized to reflect that the auditor has made a choice about the
issue presented. Per Bonner (1999), “decisions refer to making up one’s mind…and taking a course of action”,
whereas judgments are simply the “…forming of an idea, opinion, or estimate...” (p.385). Frequently judgments
precede decisions.
4
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accountability to moderate the impact of other independent variables such as personal biases,
task complexity, and perception of preparer error.
While accountability is often examined based on the impact that it has on other variables,
some research examines the impact that other variables have on accountability (i.e. the
dependent variable). Academics have considered how environmental factors influence feelings
or perceptions of accountability to gain a better understanding of the way in which the audit
environment impacts auditor decisions. These factors include review format and type of
standard. Figure 1 graphically depicts this framework and is the foundation for the following
discussion of the literature.

IV. Literature on Accountability Pressure
Accountability Pressure
Examining the Extent of Accountability Pressure
Research on accountability in auditing extensively evaluates the influence of
accountability on auditor decision making. The findings indicate that accountability can
positively influence auditor inputs by increasing cognitive effort (e.g. Johnson and Kaplan 2001;
Tan et al. 1997), increasing the breadth of substantive testing (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; Koonce et
al. 1995), and increasing identification of more useful audit procedures (DeZoort and Harrison
2016). Accountability also improves auditor performance (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; Tan and Kao
1999), as well as decision consensus, consistency, and conservatism (e.g. Ashton 1992; DeZoort
et al. 2006, Johnson and Kaplan 2001). However, the effects of accountability aren’t always
positive. In some circumstances, accountability can result in biased decision outcomes (e.g.
Bierstaker and Wright 2005; Kaplan and Lord 2001)
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The Impact of Accountability Pressure on Decision Inputs: Accountability to a party
with unknown preferences increases auditor effort (Asare et al. 2000; Buchman et al. 1996;
DeZoort et al. 2006; DeZoort and Harrison 2016; Johnson and Kaplan 1991; Koonce et al. 1995;
Tan et al. 1997). Evidence also suggests that knowledge of an evaluative party’s preference
related to the execution of the audit process has positive effects when these preferences are
associated with conducting a more effective audit (Peecher 1996; Tuner 2001; Shankar and Tan
2006).
In executing the audit, auditors who are accountable to a source with unknown views
exhibit increased cognitive effort when assessing the risk of inventory obsolescence (Tan et al.
1997) and determining the appropriate audit opinion to issue when the client is involved in a
lawsuit (Buchman et al. 1996), and display greater self-insight related to their decision-making
process (Johnson and Kaplan 1991). Buchman et al. (1996), however, find that cognitive effort
related to a reporting decision differs based on the parties to whom the auditor is accountable and
the experience level of the participant. Experienced auditors accountable to an audit partner do
not put forth significantly more cognitive effort than those who are not accountable, whereas
those auditors accountable to the client do. This finding is surprising, as one would not expect
effort levels to vary by accountability source due to the desire of an individual to reach a
defensible conclusion when the preferences of an accountability source are unknown.
Furthermore, inexperienced auditors do not differ in their effort levels across accountability
conditions. The social contingency model does not theorize how experience may influence
accountability, but the difference in findings related to experience is understandable in an audit
setting. Participants who are not experienced in contingent liabilities may not be able to make
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any decision regarding the case without significant effort, thus accountability has little impact on
the decision-making process.
Effort gains are not limited to the mere presence or absence of accountability. Research
also indicates that various levels of accountability pressure have incremental effects on cognitive
effort. Auditors susceptible to high levels of accountability pressure, displayed more cognitive
effort than those susceptible to low levels of accountability pressure when completing a
materiality assessment exercise (DeZoort et al. 2006). 5
The positive effects of accountability extend beyond just cognitive effort. Auditors also
exert more effort in executing assigned audit procedures. Specifically, accountability increases
the breadth of testing related to an unexpected gross margin increase, which results in a greater
extent of tests being conducted (Asare et al. 2000). Accountable auditors also document a greater
breadth and depth of justifications in a planning memo related to their decision to revise the audit
time budget (Koonce et al. 1995) and put forth more effort on a fraud brainstorming task by
identifying more audit procedures that could be useful in detecting fraud (DeZoort and Harrison
2016).
When individuals are accountable to a party whose preferences are known prior to
formulating their own decision, individuals tend to simply align their decisions with the
preferences of the accountability source (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). This highlights a potential
negative consequence of accountability. However, several studies in auditing find that
accountability to a source with known preferences can have a positive effect on auditor behavior.

Lerner and Tetlock (1999) acknowledge there are “several empirically distinguishable submanipulations” (p. 255)
of accountability. DeZoort et al. (2006) is the only study to investigate these different accountability manipulations
in a single study. Accountability is manipulated at four levels (from low to high)- anonymity, review, justification,
and feedback.
5
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When preferences of the accountability source are related to the way in which the audit should be
conducted, as opposed to the conclusions that should be reached, positive effects can be seen.6
Auditors accountable to reviewers who prefer a more skeptical approach to conducting an
accounts receivable (AR) collectability review evaluated a statistically similar amount of
evidence as those accountable to a reviewer whose preference was unknown (Turner 2001).
These amounts were both significantly greater than the amount of evidence reviewed by auditors
accountable to a reviewer with a preference for efficiency and leveraging client insights.
Peecher (1996) also finds that the firms’ preference regarding the way in which their auditors
approach analytical procedures impacts auditors’ consideration of evidence. Auditors’ assess the
extent to which a client’s explanation reflects the real reason for an unexpected increase in gross
margin differently depending on their firm’s preference. However, this effect is only seen when
the client is of high integrity.
While information related to the preferences of an accountability source regarding the
execution of the audit process can increase auditor effort, one study suggests that auditor effort is
also influenced by whether known preferences are similar or dissimilar to the preferences of the
accountable party (Shankar and Tan 2006). A key difference between Shankar and Tan (2006),
and the Peecher (1996) and Turner (2001) study just discussed is that the accountability source in
Shankar and Tan (2006) stated a preference related to a decision outcome, rather than a
preference related to the execution of the audit process. When the initial preference of the
accountable party and the preference of the accountability source differ regarding an adjustment

6

This is similar to process accountability, where individuals are accountable for the process used in reaching a
decision rather than the decision itself. However, in the studies looking at the direct impact of accountability
pressure, participants are not explicitly told whether they are accountable for their decision-making process of
decision outcome.
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to the allowance for doubtful accounts, auditors with high levels of technical and tacit
managerial knowledge spend more time formulating a memo justifying their decision and
document a greater breadth of issues. This increased cognitive effort appears to be related to
persuasively supporting their initial decision that is inconsistent with the preference of the party
to whom they are accountable.7 In other situations, where preferences of the accountability
source are known, accountability does not result in increased effort. Buchman et al. (1997) find
no evidence of increased auditor effort in deciding whether to disclose a lawsuit when auditors
are accountable to a source with known preferences compared to auditors who are not
accountable for their decision. Similar to Shankar and Tan (2006), these preferences are for a
particular decision outcome.
Research suggests accountability can positively impact the way in which auditors execute
their audit procedures, resulting in increased effort, more thorough testing, and a more critical
evaluation of evidence. However, the beneficial effects of accountability seem to be in situations
where the accountability source’s preferences are unknown, or are known but related to a more
effective execution of the audit process. Known preferences regarding a decision outcome can
also increase effort but seemingly occurs when the accountable party reaches an initial
conclusion prior to being told they are accountable for their decision, and the preferences of the
accountability source and the accountable party differ. Otherwise, accountability to a party with
known preferences related to a decision outcome is associated with no increases in auditor effort
when compared to those who are not accountable.

7

Auditor participants had the opportunity to revise their initial decision after discovering their work would be
reviewed by a manager and the preferences of the manager. However, the majority of auditors (72%) opted to stay
with their initial decision. Furthermore, the authors note that those auditors who did switch their decision to align
with the preferences of the reviewer would also likely put for more effort in justifying their decision to demonstrate
that the change in decisions was “for good reasons.” (Shankar and Tan, 2006 p. 479)
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The Impact of Accountability Pressure on Decision Outputs: Accountability affects not
only auditors’ effort and testing strategies, but it also influences their decisions and performance,
as well as certain decision characteristics. Only one study finds accountability to have no effect
on auditors’ decision (Koonce et al. 1995). Accountability to parties with unknown preferences
often positively influences auditor outcomes by increasing judgment consensus (Ashton 1990;
Ashton 1992; Johnson and Kaplan 1991; DeZoort et al. 2006), increasing judgment conservatism
(DeZoort et al. 2006), increasing judgment consistency (Ashton 1992), and improving auditor
performance (Asare et al. 2000; Ashton 1992; Tan and Kao 1999). However, when the views of
an accountability source are unknown but can be inferred by the accountable party, negative
auditor outcomes can occur (Buchman et al. 1996; Lord 1992). In this situation, auditors respond
in a manner similar to individuals who are accountable to a source with known preferences.
Accountability to parties with known preferences often has detrimental outcomes. Auditors tend
to simply align their decisions with the preferences of the accountability source (e.g. Bierstaker
and Wright 2005; Cohen and Trompeter 1996; Tan et al. 1997), presenting concerns regarding
auditor objectivity which has implications for audit quality. However, when known preferences
are related to the execution an effective audit, and decision outcomes are made to reflect these
preferences, the concern may not necessarily be related to audit quality, but rather audit
efficiency.
Koonce et al. (1995) find accountability to a partner with unknown views has no impact
on auditors’ time budget decisions in response to an unexpected gross margin increase, even
when auditors offer a greater breadth and depth of justifications in the audit planning memo.8

8

Robertson (2007) also finds that students, as proxies for staff auditors, are not influenced by their senior’s
preference. In a subjective audit task, participants were asked how willing they would be to report a subjective issue
concerning repairs and maintenance expenses close to the end of fieldwork. He found that the senior’s preference

20

Surprisingly, this suggests the increased effort that accountable auditors put forth in the decisionmaking process does not result in decision outcomes that significantly differ from auditors who
were not accountable.
Conversely, Lord (1992) finds that accountability does significantly influence auditors’
reporting decisions. Audit managers who expect a national office partner to review their work
are less likely to issue an unqualified audit opinion compared to auditors who are not
accountable for their decision. Buchman et al. (1996) also find that accountability influences
auditor’s reporting decisions. They find the effects of accountability to be dependent upon
auditor experience. Participants who have experience with contingent liabilities related to a
lawsuit and are accountable to the client, recommend issuing an unqualified opinion, while
experienced participants accountable to the partner support issuing a qualified opinion.9
Interestingly, while these studies do not explicitly state the preferences of the accountability
source, participants’ decisions are influenced in a manner that suggests the participants speculate
the preferences of the accountability source and respond accordingly. In an audit reporting
context, these findings are not surprising, as auditors likely know the preferences of an
accountability source. This is consistent with Lerner and Tetlock (1999) who state that “…when
participants…can guess the views of their prospective audience…[they] abandon their effortful

for either a quality audit or meeting the deadline for completing field work did not influence the participants’
decisions. This study did not operationalize accountability in any manner, which may be attributing to these results.
The results may also be due to the inexperience of the student participants who may have overall uncertainty on how
to handle the issue, thus they default to disclosing the issue to their senior.
9
Participants were aware of the partner and client’s preferences regarding disclosure. However, preferences related
to the appropriate opinion were not explicitly stated. It is expected, however, that in this setting where disclosure
preferences are provided, that the auditors could have speculated the preferences of partner and client and made
decisions accordingly.
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attempts to reach a justifiable position and simply shift toward the presumed views of the
prospective audience” (p.257).
While decision outcomes may not always be positively affected by accountability
pressure, accountability pressure does positively influence certain decision characteristics.
Ashton (1990) and Ashton (1992) find that auditors who are required to justify their decisions
related to a bond rating task display greater decision consensus than individuals who are not
required to justify their decisions.10 Johnson and Kaplan (1991) also find accountable auditors to
have greater consensus in their risk assessments related to inventory obsolescence compared to
auditors who are not accountable. DeZoort et al. (2006) find positive effects due to increased
accountability pressure, which also results in less decision variability (i.e. greater decision
consensus), as well as increased conservatism in auditors’ materiality decisions. Ashton (1992)
finds increased consistency in an auditor’s decision making process across similar decisions,
indicating a consistent application of knowledge by the auditor.
The positive effects of accountability on certain decision characteristics also appear to be
associated with improved auditor performance in certain circumstances. Ashton (1992) finds a
justification requirement improves auditor accuracy on a bond rating exercise.11 Asare et al.
(2000) also see performance gains due to accountability pressure. They find that accountability
increases auditors’ ability to identify the reason for an account fluctuation. This improvement in
performance is attributable to the increased breadth of testing that the auditors conduct. Tan and

10

This study did not operationalize accountability beyond requiring written justification and the submission of the
participant’s justification sheet at the end of the experiment. However, as the participants were practicing auditors,
and the study was conducted at a firm training session, participants likely felt as though their responses may be
reviewed by an evaluative other within the firm.
11
Ashton (1990) also finds increased decision accuracy (i.e. performance) on a bond rating task. However, the
increase is not statistically significant.
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Kao (1999) also find that auditor accountability improves performance, but only on medium and
high complexity tasks when certain levels of knowledge and problem solving ability are present.
As discussed above, accountability to parties within unknown views can have a positive
influence on auditor decision making outputs. However, the positive effect of accountability
diminishes when individuals are accountable to parties with known or speculated preferences. In
this situation, accountability influences auditor decision making such that auditors make
decisions that align more closely with the preferences of the accountability source, essentially
introducing bias into the audit process.12 Accountability can also negatively affect auditors’
decisions related to audit planning (Bierstaker and Wright 2005), inventory obsolescence risk
assessments (Tan et al. 1997), and acceptance of client proposed accounting treatments (Cohen
and Trompeter 1996, Kaplan and Lord 2001). One exception is Buchman et al. (1996), who find
that the preferences of the accountability source do not always influence auditors’ decisions.
Furthermore, auditors are not only influenced by knowing the views of the party to whom they
are accountable, but recent research suggests the point at which auditors are informed of their
superior’s preferences has an impact on the decision outcomes (Peytcheva and Gillett 2011;
Wilks 2002).
Bierstaker and Wright (2005) find that partner preferences regarding the audit approach
influence auditors’ audit planning decisions. When partners prefer a balanced audit approach,
auditors appear to alter budgeted hours in a manner that is consistent with their audit risk
assessments, as would be expected.13 However, when auditors are accountable to partners with a

12

This statement is not to suggest bias is good or bad, but rather that it exists. Whether the effect of accountability
is positive or negative in situations that require auditor judgments and the views of evaluative other are known is
subjective.
13
There was a positive relationship between risk assessments and planned testing for auditors accountable to a
partner with a preference for a balance audit approach. However, this relationship was not significant.
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preference for efficiency, the results suggest that budgeted hours and planned tests are not risk
adjusted, but rather reflect the partner’s preference for an efficient audit. Tan et al. (1997) also
find auditors to be influenced by their superior’s preference. Auditors’ risk assessments related to
inventory obsolescence are significantly different for auditors with knowledge of their partner’s
preference compared to auditors who have no knowledge of their partner’s preference.
Furthermore, a partner’s attitude regarding client continuance, and the types of clients to retain,
influences audit manager’s likelihood of accepting the client’s proposed treatment for research
and development costs (Cohen and Trompeter 1998). Auditors respond in a similar manner when
they can speculate the preferences of the person to whom they are accountable. Kaplan and Lord
(2001) find accountable audit managers alter self- judgments to conform to what they speculate
the partner’s preference to be when dealing with a subjective reporting decision.14
Counter to Tetlock’s social contingency model and the findings of many auditing studies,
Buchman et al. (1996) find that accountability to a party with known preferences does not
influence auditors’ decision to disclose a lawsuit. Auditors accountable to the client do not make
disclosure decisions that are significantly different from auditors accountable to the partner, as
most participants adopt the partner’s preference and recommend disclosure (Buchman et al.
1996). This finding may be attributable to the two dependent variables in the case. Participants
were required to make a disclosure decision regarding a contingent lawsuit, as well as a reporting
decision. One reason participants might not align their decision with the preferences of the client

14

Kaplan and Lord (2001) also expected participants to increase cognitive effort in this situation, as they would
employ a “hybrid” strategy to deal with the uncertainty regarding the accountability source’s preference. This hybrid
strategy would involve thorough information processing in order to respond any objections by the accountability
source but a decision outcome that aligns with the preferences they believe the accountability source has. They did
not find results related to effort, which I speculate is attributable to the limited uncertainty regarding the preference
of a national partner in the reporting case scenario provided.
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when making the disclosure decision, is they feel a client would be less contentious about the
requirement of a footnote disclosure, as opposed to the issuance of an unfavorable audit opinion.
Furthermore, auditors may have placed a bit more importance on the disclosure decisions, as
deciding whether to disclose the lawsuit made the difference between investors having some or
no information regarding the potential contingent liability.
The timing of when an individual becomes aware of an accountability source’s
preference also appears to influence decisions in certain situations (Wilks 2002; Peytcheva and
Gillet 2011). Research suggests that obtaining knowledge of a superior’s preference prior to
evidence evaluation, as opposed to after, results in greater decision alignment with the superior’s
preference. Knowledge of the superior’s preference prior to evidence evaluation influences the
way in which auditors think about the evidence (Wilks 2002). Furthermore, when knowledge of
a superior’s preference comes after one’s own judgment has been formed, auditors appear to
adjust their original judgment to align with their superior’s preference. There is no significant
difference in judgments between auditors who are informed of their superior’s preference before
or after formulating their own decision, suggesting auditors align their decisions with the
preferences of their superior in both situations (Peytcheva and Gillet 2011). Interestingly,
Peytcheva and Gillet (2011) find somewhat different results from Shankar and Tan (2006).
Shankar and Tan (2006) find that auditors do not tend to alter decisions so that they align with a
reviewer’s preferences but rather put forth increased effort in documenting their justification for
their conclusion. The difference in findings may be due to documented evidence of altering one’s
decision to conform to the reviewer’s preference. In Shankar and Tan (2006), auditors are
required to document their initial decision, whereas Peytcheva and Gillet (2006) simply require
participants to acknowledge they made a decision without documenting the conclusion.
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Accountability research focusing on auditor outcomes suggests accountability can
positively influence auditor decisions, auditor decision characteristics, and performance.
However, these positive effects appear to be limited to situations where the preference of the
accountability source is unknown. Accountability to sources with known or speculated
preferences generally results in decision alignment, regardless of when in the decision process
auditors are informed of these preferences.
Overall, the auditing literature examining accountability pressure often finds that
accountability benefits auditor judgment and decision making. However, these benefits appear
to be dependent upon whether the views of the accountability source are known or unknown, as
well as the type of preference that the accountability source has—whether the preference is
related to the execution of the audit, or the decision the auditor should reach. Accountability
appears to have harmful effects on auditor inputs and auditor outputs under three different
circumstances: (1)when an accountability source’s preferences for a decision outcome are
known, (2) when an accountability source’s preferences regarding the execution of the audit are
known and call for ineffective or overly efficient auditor conduct, thus sacrificing audit quality,
and (3) when auditors can speculate as to the accountability source’s preferences regarding a
decision outcome. Accountability to individuals with unknown views generally has positive
effects on auditor inputs and auditor outputs, unless one can speculate as to the accountability
source’s preference regarding a decision outcome. On the other hand, accountability to
individuals with known views generally has negative effects on auditor inputs and auditor
outputs, unless the preference is related to effectively executing the audit process.
As with any research stream, some studies find results counter to theoretical expectations.
Buchman et al. (1996) did not find accountability pressure to a party with known preferences
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regarding a disclosure decision influences auditors’ disclosure decisions. Koonce (1995) did not
find accountability pressure to a party with unknown views influences auditors’ decisions, even
though the accountable participants appear to engagement in a more cognitively effortful
decision making process. Future research should continue to investigate situations where
accountability functions differently in an audit setting, and consider environmental features and
personal attributes that interact with the accountability pressure.
Examining the Type of Pressure: Process vs. Outcome
Outcome accountability represents accountability for an individual’s final decision or
outcome, whereas process accountability represents accountability for the process one went
through to reach their decision (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Early auditing research on
accountability does not distinguish between these two types of accountability. Very little
auditing research to date investigates the effects of process and outcome accountability on
auditor decision making. Peecher et al. (2014) propose an accountability framework composed of
two dimensions- penalties and rewards vs. process accountability and outcome accountability.
Their framework highlights the accountability mechanisms used in the current environment and
draws attention to the absence of mechanisms focused on process accountability. However,
Peecher et al. (2014) propose that employing such mechanisms may be a more beneficial for
improving auditor decision making.
Only one experimental audit study to date has sought to directly investigate the effects of
process and outcome accountability on auditor effort and decision making. Kim and Trotman
(2014) investigate the influence of accountability type on auditors’ level of professional
skepticism. In the outcome accountability condition, participants are informed that they may be
contacted and “asked to justify and provide explanations for their final judgment on the
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likelihood of a material misstatement”, while participants in the process accountability condition
are told they may be contacted and “asked to justify and provide explanations for the judgment
process they used leading up to their final judgment on the likelihood of a material
misstatement” (p.11).
Kim and Trotman (2014) find that auditor skepticism and cognitive effort related to an
analytical review task increase when participants are accountable for their decision-making
processes, compared to when they are accountable for their decision outcomes. Furthermore,
participants generate significantly more plausible explanations for an unexpected account
fluctuation when they are accountable for their process, rather than outcome. Research also
suggests the effect of process accountability is greatest for novice auditors (Kim and Trotman
2014).
Although no general conclusions can be drawn based on one research study, it is evident
that additional research in this area is needed. Understanding how process and outcome
accountability may influence the way in which auditors conduct the audit and the decisions that
they make is important.
Examining the Source of Accountability Pressure: Single vs. Multiple
Very little research in the last two decades considers the influence of multiple
accountability relationships on auditors’ decision making processes. However, accounting
researchers frequently acknowledges the presence of multiple accountability pressures in the
auditing environment (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996). Multiple
accountability relationships refer to auditors’ accountability to multiple sources, including
supervisors, clients, regulatory bodies, etc. An early study on accountability in accounting
collected questionnaire data from accountants in public practice and evaluated their responses
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associated with a situation where they faced multiple accountability pressures (Gibbins and
Newton 1994). They evaluate accountants’ responses to multiple accountability pressures in
situations where the accountability sources agree or disagree, the accountable party’s initial
position was the same as or different from those of the accountability sources, and the strength of
accountability pressure felt by the accountable party varies. Overall, Gibbins and Newton (1994)
do find these three factors are associated with the course of action an accountant takes when
responding to multiple accountability pressures. However, the experience of a delay in the
decision-making process is only related to two of the three factors, as the strength of
accountability pressure is not associated with delay. The results of this study support the
expanded model of accountability that Gibbins and Newton (1994) propose and suggest is
necessary to evaluate accountability in a professional setting.
While Gibbins and Newton (1994) used a field questionnaire to investigate auditor
responses to multiple accountability pressures, very limited experimental research investigates
auditor decision making in a multiple accountability setting. The limited work that has been done
in the area considers how managing multiple accountability pressures impacts auditor affect and
performance (Bagley 2010), and auditor decision-making (Gramling 1999; Bierstaker and
Wright 2001).
Bagley (2010) investigates the influence of multiple accountability pressure on auditor
affect and auditor performance. She finds that auditors experience negative affective reactions to
accountability pressure from multiple parties. Negative affect is significantly higher for auditors
facing multiple accountability pressures, compared to auditors accountable to a single source and
those auditors who are not accountable. She finds that increased negative affect diminishes task
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performance, but only on low complexity tasks. High task complexity results in poor
performance regardless of accountability pressures.
Gramling (1999) and Bierstaker and Wright (2001) investigate the effect that client and
partner pressure have on auditors’ planning decisions. Gramling (1999) subjects auditors to
pressure from both the client and the partner and finds that auditors planning decisions related to
budgeted audit hours are significantly influenced by the client’s preference (lower fees or highquality audit), regardless of the partner’s preference (efficiency and profitability or quality and
skepticism). This suggests that only the client’s preference influenced the auditors’ decisions.
Interestingly, Bierstaker and Wright (2001) find similar results. They investigate the auditor’s
willingness to change the budgeted audit hours and planned tests from the prior year when faced
with partner pressure and client fee pressure. They manipulate partner pressure as present
(preference for efficiency) or absent (no preference) and client fee pressure as present (fees
reduced from prior year) or absent (fees are same as last year). Results show that the fee pressure
significantly impacts the auditor’s change in budgeted audit hours, but there is no main effect for
partner pressure. However, they do find that both client fee pressure and partner pressure affect
the percentage change in the number of planned tests. Participants subject to both client fee
pressure and partner pressure also make significantly greater reductions in planned tests
compared to those in either pressure condition suggesting the multiple pressures have an additive
effect in influencing auditor decision making related to planned testing.
Research acknowledges the presence of multiple accountability pressure in auditing, yet
limited research investigates its effect on auditor decision making. Bagley (2010) provides
evidence that multiple accountability pressures increase negative affect, thus hindering
performance on low complexity tasks. However, little is known about how specific sources of
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pressure influence decisions. Gramling (1999) and Bierstaker and Wright (2001) find some
evidence that in a client/partner pressure setting, the client’s preference more heavily influences
auditors’ decisions. These results should be considered in light of the operationalization of
accountability in both studies. Accountability to each pressure source (partner and client) was not
operationalized separately. Participants were accountable for their performance on the overall
task by providing their name and a justification for their decision, which may be reviewed by
their firm partner and/or researcher. The partner and/or research may also follow up with
participants about their decision. It is unclear how auditors might respond if justification to both
accountability sources is required. Future research should continue to investigate the influence
that multiple accountability pressures have on auditor decision making.

Examining the Impact of Environmental Factors on Accountability Pressure
Research that considers how an auditor’s environment influences their feelings of
accountability is limited. However, some research related to the review process (Brazel et al.
2004), and types of accounting standards (Peytcheva et al. 2014) investigates the influence that
these elements have on perceived accountability and audit outcomes.15
Face-to-face delivery of review comments has positive effects on auditor effort and
decisions. Brazel et al. (2004) attributes the positive results to increased feelings of
accountability. Auditors anticipating face-to-face delivery of review notes experienced greater
feelings of accountability than auditors anticipating electronic delivery of review notes. These

15

Additional papers consider how the review process (Payne et al. 2010) and auditing standards (Hackenbrack and
Nelson 1996; Cohen et al. 2013) influence auditor decisions. However, they do not directly manipulate
accountability or measure feelings of accountability, but rather utilize accountability as theoretical support for their
expectations.
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increased feelings of accountability result in increased time spent on a going concern evaluation
task and higher judgment quality compared to auditors receiving electronic reviews.
Accounting standards have significant influence on the judgments and decisions of
auditors, as auditors work to ensure that a company’s financial statements are prepared in
accordance with these standards. Peytcheva et al. (2014) investigate how two types of auditing
standards (rules vs. principles-based standards) influence auditors’ cognitive motivations and
decisions in a lease classification task. They find that principle-based standards increase
auditors’ feelings of process accountability. In turn, this improves auditors’ epistemic motivation
and increases auditors’ demand for evidence.
As demonstrated above, elements of the audit environment can influence auditors’
feelings of accountability, which in turn affects decision outcomes. Significant research
considers the impact that accountability pressure has auditor decision making, but additional
research should investigate how various elements of the auditor’s work environment affect their
feelings of accountability. It is important to understand how auditors are influenced by, and
respond to, the environment within which they work.

Understanding Factors that Moderate the Impact of Accountability Pressure
To provide a better understanding of the way in which accountability influences auditor
decision making, it is important to consider elements in the audit environment that may influence
the effect that accountability has on auditor inputs and auditor outputs. Decisions aids, task
complexity, auditor attributes, and client attributes have all been shown to moderate the impact
of accountability on decision outcomes.
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Decision aids have been shown to both diminish and magnify the effect of accountability
on auditor decision making, thus providing mixed evidence regarding the influence that decision
aids have on the relationship between accountability and auditor outcomes (Ashton 1990;
DeZoort et al. 2006). Ashton (1990) finds a decision aid with high implicit performance
standards hinders the positive effects that justification has on auditor performance. Auditors who
are provided a decision aid to use in a bond rating task show decreased performance accuracy
and increased variability in responses when they must justify their decision regarding the
appropriate bond ratings for several companies, compared to when no justification is required.
Conversely, DeZoort et al. (2006) find that the presence of a decision aid improves the
consistency and conservatism of decisions related to a materiality assessment when auditors are
accountable for their decisions.
Certain task characteristics and auditor attributes also influences the effectiveness of
accountability. Tan and Kao (1999) find that the effect of accountability is moderated by task
complexity, auditor knowledge, and auditor problem solving ability. Accountability is not
effective at improving performance on a low complexity task. However, accountability’s
effectiveness on medium to high complexity tasks depends on the auditor’s level of knowledge
and their problem-solving ability. Accountability improves performance on medium-complexity
tasks, but only when the auditor has an appropriate level of knowledge to complete the task. On
high-complexity tasks, the auditor must have the appropriate knowledge level and problem
solving ability for accountability to effectively enhance performance. Buchman et al. (1996)
finds results similar to Tan and Kao (1999) in that the impact of accountability is limited to the
judgments of auditors with task specific knowledge, thus suggesting knowledge is an important
factor in determining the effectiveness of accountability. Also related to Tan and Kao (1999),
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Bagley (2010) investigates the influence that multiple accountability pressures have on the
completion of both high and low-complexity tasks. She finds that the performance decline
caused by multiple accountability pressures (via negative affect) is only seen in situations where
task complexity is low. Auditor performance is not impacted by multiple accountability
pressures on highly complex tasks.
Lastly, Peecher (1996) investigates the ability of client integrity to mitigate the influence
of audit partner preferences on auditors’ decisions. He finds that auditors accountable to a
partner more concerned with auditor efficiency and cost (credence preference) assess a higher
likelihood that the client’s explanation accounted for much of the change in an account balance,
compared to those accountable to a partner with a preference for objectivity (skepticism
preference). However, this finding only holds when client integrity is high. For low integrity
clients, likelihood assessments did not differ significantly.
Overall, multiple factors associated with the audit task, the auditor, and the client are
shown to moderate the relationship between accountability and performance. Research shows
that accountability is only effective when auditors have the ability and the appropriate level of
knowledge or experience to complete their assigned tasks (Buchman et al. 1996, Tan and Kao
1999). It also suggests that a partner’s preference for either an efficient or effective audit only
influences auditors’ decisions regarding the acceptance of a client’s explanation when the client
is of high integrity (Peecher 1996). Thus, the effectiveness of accountability is contingent upon
client integrity in certain situations.
Research investigating task complexity and accountability is inconclusive, as
accountability is found to be ineffective in situations where task complexity is low (Tan and Kao
1999), yet it is also found to be ineffective in situations where task complexity is high (Bagley
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2010). These findings suggest there are boundary conditions related to task complexity such that
when a task is too difficult, accountability will have no effect as performance will be poor
regardless of accountability pressure, and when a task is too easy, accountability will have no
effect as the task is so simple all participants will do well.
Furthermore, research on the effect of decision aids on accountability have also been
mixed. Ashton (1990) shows the presence of a decision aid diminishes auditor’s decision quality,
while DeZoort et al. (2006) find decision aids improve accountable auditors’ decision quality.
This difference may be attributable to a variety of factors such as the type of aid provided or the
type of decision task utilized. However, future research should continue to investigate those
situations in which the presence of a decision aid improves versus diminishes decision quality.

The Impact of Accountability Pressure as a Moderator of Factors Affecting Decisions
Accountability does not only directly affect auditor performance, but does so indirectly as
well. Accountability has been shown to mitigate certain personal biases, as well as the effect of
task complexity and perception of preparers on auditor decision making.
Kennedy (1993) and Kennedy (1995) focus on accountability as a bias-reducing
mechanism. Kennedy (1993) speculates that accountability can successfully mitigate personal
biases that are effort related, but not those that are data related. Data related biases occur when
the auditor’s knowledge or memory (i.e. internal data) or environmental cues (i.e. external data)
related to the decision context are faulty or inadequate. She finds evidence that accountability
mitigates recency bias, an effort related bias, when individuals are unfamiliar with an assigned
task. Participants who are told they are accountable for their decisions prior to evidence
evaluation exhibit no recency bias, compared to individuals who are told they are accountable for
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decisions after evidence evaluation and those who are not accountable at all. On the other hand,
participants familiar with the task showed no evidence of recency bias in any condition.
Furthermore, Kennedy (1995) finds evidence to support her expectation that accountability will
not mitigate data-related biases. She conducts two experiments and finds that accountability does
not mitigate the curse of knowledge bias in a going concern assessment task or analytical review
task. The curse of knowledge reflects the inability of individuals to disregard information they
previously processed.
Tan and Tan (2008) consider whether accountability can overcome the tendency of
workpaper preparers and reviewers to incorporate previously invalidated evidence into their
decision-making process. Specifically, they investigate whether preparers and reviewers adjust
likelihood assessments regarding their clients’ chances of winning a significant contract after
receiving information that the evidence indicating the client would win is invalidated.
Accountability is operationalized by informing the workpaper preparers that their responses will
be read by a faculty member performing the role of a reviewer. Workpaper reviewers are told
their responses will be read by a graduate student performing the role of a preparer. Tan and Tan
(2008)) find that both reviewers and preparers are unable to fully remove the invalidated
information from their judgments, such that they continue to make significantly different
judgments from the group that does not initially receive the invalidated information. However,
accountability moderates the effect of invalidated evidence for reviewers, but not preparers.
These results are somewhat surprising given Kennedy’s (1995) finding that accountability does
not mitigate the curse of knowledge. The curse of knowledge (Kennedy 1995) and the
consideration of invalidated evidence (Tan and Tan 2008) appear to be similar biases, both of
which are data related biases per Kennedy’s (1995) framework. As such, one would not expect
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accountability to mitigate the tendency of individuals to consider previously invalidated evidence
in one’s decision making process.
A separate study considers the impact of process accountability on the status quo
heuristic- the tendency to keep things as they are rather than make a change. Messier et al.
(2014) investigate whether auditors are subject to the status quo heuristic when there is a change
from principles to rules based accounting, such that they continue to employ the principles based
approach under the new rules based accounting guidance. They then investigate whether process
accountability can moderate the effect of the status quo heuristic. Process accountability is
operationalized as high or low by informing participants either before or after making their
decision, respectively, that they are required to justify their decisions to the partner on the
engagement and he is concerned with the process used to reach their final decision. Participants
are required to decide the appropriate treatment for current year research and development costs.
They find that high process accountability does mitigate the effect of the status quo heuristic.
Accountability is not always expected to mitigate the relationship between an
independent variable and dependent variable. In certain situations, it is expected to exacerbate
the relationship. Glover (1997) and Hoffman and Patton (1997) evaluate the tendency of
accountability to magnify the dilution effect, as has been demonstrated in social psychology
research (Tetlock and Boettger 1989). The dilution effect reflects individuals’ tendency to
incorporate non-diagnostic information in their decision-making processes. Glover (1997)
expects accountability will exacerbate the dilution effect due to increased cognitive processing of
information. Auditor participants perform an AR risk assessment task. Participants assess the risk
of material misstatement in AR after reviewing several pieces of audit evidence. Counter to
social psychology research, Glover (1997) finds that accountability has no impact on the dilution
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effect; however, he finds evidence to suggest that time pressure may mitigate the dilution effect.
Similarly, Hoffman and Patton (1997) also find that accountability does not exacerbate the
dilution effect. Auditors complete a fraud risk assessment task where they are given relevant and
irrelevant information related to the risk of fraud. Accountable auditors are expected to make
lower fraud risk assessments, suggesting the inclusion of irrelevant information in their decision
processes. However, accountable and non-accountable auditors do not significantly differ in the
magnitude of the dilution effect. Conversely, Favere-Marchesi and Pincus (2006) also investigate
the influence of accountability on the dilution effect utilizing internal auditors as participants.
The authors not only consider the magnitude of the dilution effect but also the frequency. They
anticipate accountable auditors will experience the dilution effect less frequently; however, when
it does occur, the magnitude of the effect will be greater than when the auditor is not
accountable. This study provides some evidence that accountability diminishes the frequency
with which dilution effect occurs. However, when the dilution effect does occur, accountability
exacerbates its magnitude (Favere-Marchesi and Pincus 2006).
While accountability reduces the impact of certain heuristics and biases, it magnifies
other relationships. Rich (2004) finds that accountability pressure strengthens the effect that
perceived probability of preparer error has on the audit review process. He finds that a high
perception of workpaper preparer error, which is magnified by high accountability pressure,
results in a more highly critical thought process during the review. Furthermore, the number of
highly critical thoughts during review is inversely related to the reviewer’s agreement with the
preparer’s work, which in turn, is associated with amount of preparer follow up that is required.
High accountability pressure exacerbates the positive relationship between perceived probability
of preparer error and the extent of critical thought employed during review.
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Research has also examined the extent to which accountability will moderate the
relationship between task complexity and performance. While Tan and Kao (1999) conclude that
task complexity moderates the impact of accountability, a follow up study by Tan et al. (2002)
examines whether accountability moderates the impact of task complexity. Tan et al. (2002)
assess the moderating effect of accountability (a proxy for motivation) and knowledge (a proxy
for skills) on task complexity’s effect on performance. Utilizing the data from Tan and Kao
(1999), they find that the relationship between task complexity and performance on a highly
complex task is only moderated by accountability if participant knowledge is also high.
Overall, these results suggest accountability is successful at mitigating certain effort
related biases (Kennedy 1993, Messier et al. 2014), but findings are mixed on the ability of
accountability to mitigate certain data related biases. Tan and Tan (2008) find that accountability
can mitigate individuals’ tendencies to include invalidated evidence into their decision-making
processes. However, this appears to be a data related bias similar to the curse of knowledge, and
Kennedy (1995) does not find accountability to be successful at mitigating the curse of
knowledge. As such, additional research is needed to more clearly determine the type of biases
that accountability may successfully overcome.
Furthermore, counter to findings from social psychology, research suggests that
accountability does not appear to exacerbate the dilution effect, but may actually mitigate it. This
is likely due to the nature of the audit environment coupled with auditors’ diligent information
processing under high accountability pressure (Favere-Marchesi and Pincus 2006). In an auditing
context, it is important that individuals consider the extent to which information cues are
diagnostic versus non-diagnostic prior to formulating a decision. Thus, high accountability
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pressure allows individuals to more effectively identify and disregard non-diagnostic
information, resulting in decreased occurrences of the dilution effect.
The relationship between a reviewer’s perception of preparer error and the extent of
critical thought employed during the review process is exacerbated by accountability pressure.
This finding can also be attributed to the more diligent information processing that occurs under
high accountability pressure. Additionally, accountability pressure, in conjunction with high
auditor knowledge, moderates the effect of task complexity on auditor performance when task
complexity is high.

V. Conclusion and Opportunities for Future Research
Extensive experimental research on accountability in auditing has been conducted over
the last two decades and has increased our understanding of the influence that accountability has
on auditor effort, evidence evaluation and testing strategies, and decisions. Accountability
improves auditor effort and decision making in many circumstances. It is also effective at
mitigating various biases, as well as the negative impact that certain task characteristics have on
audit outcomes. Accountability also explains the way in which various environmental factors
affect auditor decision making.
Given the extent to which accountability mechanisms are engrained in the audit
environment, it is important to continue to investigate the effect that accountability has on the
audit process and auditor decision making. A significant amount of research considers the impact
of accountability to a single source, and shows that the accountability pressure often has a
positive effect on auditor outputs and inputs. However, accountability pressure can have
detrimental effects when auditors are aware of the preferences of the party to whom they are
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accountable, and those preferences relate to a decision outcome. When auditors are informed of
the accountability source’s preference related to an effective execution of the audit process,
auditors increase the amount of evidence reviewed, and display greater skepticism towards client
provided explanations. Research also considers how the timing of these preferences influences
auditors’ decisions. Wilks (2002) investigates how the timing of a partner’s preference (before or
after evidence evaluation) influences decisions. In this case, the partner’s preference is related to
their concern regarding the weighting of evidence. Future research should investigate the effects
that timing has on decisions when a partner’s decision preference is known, yet evidence
evaluation is required. Do auditors engage in decision alignment to the same extent in both
situations? Related to timing, researchers may also want to consider how justification timing
influences effort and decisions. Current research assumes any operationalization of justification
to be immediate or in the near future. Does the temporal distance related to justification affect
audit outcomes? Furthermore, researchers should also continue to investigate the effect of similar
and dissimilar preferences. Reactions to similar and dissimilar preferences may be dependent
upon one’s views of the accountability source. Do auditors respond to similar and dissimilar
preferences when the accountability source is not a person they hold in high regard? This issue
could also be investigated without consideration of preference similarity. Does accountability
influence auditors’ decisions when they do or do not think highly of the accountability source?
Accountability type and accountability sources are both very under-researched.
Researchers have just started to consider the influence that process and outcome accountability
have on auditor decision making. Peecher et al. (2014) proposes research questions related to
accountability type, primarily focusing on the implementation of an auditor judgment rule. Given
the multiple accountability pressures that auditors face, research should consider how auditors
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respond to differing accountability types. How are auditors’ decisions influenced by two
accountability sources, one with a focus on outcome accountability and the other with a focus on
process accountability?
Auditors’ management of multiple accountability pressures is another very underresearched area given the reality of these pressures in the audit work environment. There are
many research opportunities associated with auditors’ management of multiple accountability
pressures, particularly when they have preferences that are conflicting. Do auditors’ relationships
with, and attitudes towards, multiple accountability sources influence auditors’ decisions (i.e.
respect for the individual, credibility of the source, power level, personal identification with the
source, etc.)? Do auditor characteristics influence their response to multiple accountability
pressures (work experience, task experience, confidence in ability, etc.)? Furthermore,
researchers should also investigate how environmental characteristics associated with the
multiple accountability pressures affect auditors. What impact does a difference in the physical
location of each accountability source have on auditors’ decisions?
Researchers should also continue to investigate issues that have found mixed results in
the literature. Decisions aids have been found to mitigate and magnify the effect of
accountability. Additional research should focus on identifying those circumstances where
magnification and mitigation occur. Understanding how accountability influences various
personal biases or heuristics should continually be evaluated due to the prevalence of
accountability mechanisms in auditing. Does accountability mitigate the effect of ego depletion
on auditor performance? Does accountability exacerbate or mitigate confirmation bias? Given
the mixed results regarding data related biases, research should continue to investigate those
circumstances where accountability will and will not mitigate data related biases.
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Although significant research has been done related to accountability, the opportunities
for future research are significant. Research in this is area is extremely important as auditors face
multiple accountability mechanisms that continually influence the way audits are conducted and
the conclusions that are reached. Furthermore, as the audit environment evolves with changes in
technology, changes in auditing and accounting standards, and changes in regulatory oversight,
research should continue to investigate how these changes affect auditor perceptions of
accountability and auditor decision making processes.
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Table 1: Table of Experimental Audit Literature on Accountability
Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

Asare,
Trompeter,
and Wright
2000

Contemporary
Accounting
Research

91 auditors
(Big 6)

Analytical
Procedures Task

- Extent, breadth, and depth
of testing
- Focus of testing
- Decision performance

Unknown

Ashton 1990

Journal of
Accounting
Research

182 KPMG
Peat Marwick
auditors

Bond Rating
Task

- Judgment accuracynumber of correct bond
ratings
-Judgment variability

Unknown

Ashton 1992

Organizational
Behavior and
Human Decision
Processes

59 KPMG
Peat Marwick
auditors

Bond Rating
Task

- Judgment accuracynumber of correct bond
ratings
- Judgment consistency
- Judgment consensus

Unknown

48

Findings
- Accountability increases the
number of tests auditors’ conduct, as
well as the number of hypotheses
tested
- Accountability increases auditors’
focus on testing error causes for an
unexpected account fluctuation.
- Accountability indirectly affects
performance through auditors’
changed testing strategies
- When no decision aid is present, a
justification requirement on a bond
rating task increases auditor accuracy
and decreases decision variability
among participants
- The presence of a high performing
decision aid in conjunction with a
justification requirement, feedback,
or an incentive decrease decision
accuracy and variability relative to
the presence of only the aid.
-Auditors who were either required
to justify their decisions or were
provided the bond rating
recommendations of a mechanical
aid had greater judgment accuracy
and consistency than a control group
who was provided no aid and had no
justification requirement.
- The availability of a decision aid
increases accuracy to a greater extent
than the justification requirement.
-Requiring justification is more
effective at improving judgment
consistency and consensus than the

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

Findings
presence of a mechanical decision
aid.

Bagley 2010

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

136 auditors

Internal control
task and ratio
analysis task

- Measure of affect
- Task performance

Unknown
and Known

Bierstaker
and Wright
2001

Advances in
Accounting

83 auditors

Planning

- Percent change in
budgeted hours from prior
year
- Change in number of
planned test from prior year

Known

Bierstaker
and Wright
2005

Advances in
Accounting

61 auditors
(avg. of 46.2
months of
experience)

Planning

-Percent change in budgeted
hours from prior year
- Change in number of
planned test from prior year

Known

49

- Finds that increased accountability
results in increased negative affect
- Finds that increased negative affect
only negatively impacts performance
when task complexity is low
- Client fee pressure was found to
impact auditors’ adjustments to the
budgeted audit hours
- Both client fee pressure and partner
pressure impacted auditors’
adjustments to planned tests
'- Auditors accountable to a partner
with preference for a balanced audit
approach appear to alter budgeted
hours (but not number of tests) in a
manner that is consistent with their
audit risk assessments
- Auditors accountable to a partner
with a preference for efficiency do
not appear to appear to adjust
budgeted hours and planned tests in a
manner consistent with client risks
(not risk adjusted), but rather in a
manner that reflect the partner’s
preference for an efficient audit.
- In the balanced condition, auditors
made higher risk assessments and
demanded a greater number of tests
and hours than those in the efficiency
condition.

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Brazel,
Agoglia, and
Hatfield 2004

The Accounting
Review

45 audit
seniors

Reporting

Going concern assessment
and related workpaper
documentation
- Audit efficiency
- Workpaper effectiveness
- Judgment quality
- Deviation from prior year
- Documentation
- Recall

Unknown

Buchman,
Tetlock, and
Reed 1996

Journal of
Business Finance
and Accounting

92 auditors

Reporting

Known

Cohen and
Trompeter
1998

Contemporary
Accounting
Research

74 audit
managers
(Big 6)

Client
Acceptance

- Decision regarding the
appropriate method for
disclosing a lawsuit
-Decision regarding the
appropriate opinion to issue
for the client
- List of important factors
considered when making
each decision
- Level of effort that should
be exerted to obtain (or
retain) the client
- Level of recommendation
for accepting the client’s
position related to R&D
accounting

50

Views

Known

Findings
- Auditors anticipating a face to face
review felt more accountable than
auditors in the electronic review
condition
- Auditors anticipating a face to face
review had higher quality judgments,
deviated further from prior year
assessments, had higher concern for
effectiveness, and took more time
than those anticipating electronic
review
-Auditors anticipating a face to face
review also remember and document
more evidence that does not align
with prior year conclusions
- Accountability did not significantly
affect the auditors’ disclosure
decisions.
- Finds that auditors with prior task
experience who are accountable for
their work make reporting decisions
more consistent with the preferences
of the party to whom they are
accountable
- Auditors suggest putting forth more
effort to keep an existing client,
compared to obtaining a potential
client
- Partners with a more aggressive
attitude towards practice
development result in managers
suggesting to1.) put forth more effort to obtain or
retain a client and
2.) accept the client's preferred
treatment for an R&D expense

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

DeZoort,
Harrison, and
Taylor 2006

Accounting,
Organizations
and Society

160 auditors

Planning

- Judgment regarding the
appropriate planning
materiality amount
- Materiality of the proposed
adjustment to the client's
allowance for uncollectible
accounts balance
- Judgment explanations

Unknown

DeZoort and
Harrison
2016

Journal of
Business Ethics

241 external
auditors
637 internal
auditors

Fraud
Brainstorming

- Number of fraud related
audit procedures identified
when brainstorming
-Assessment of auditor’s
responsibility for detecting
fraud

Unknown

FavereMarchesi and
Pincus 2006

Advances in
Accounting
Behavioral
Research

192 internal
auditors

Fraud Risk
Assessment

-Frequency of the dilution
effect
-Magnitude of the dilution
effect

Unknown

51

Findings
- Auditors subject to high
accountability pressure (compared to
those subject to low accountability
pressure):
1. are more conservative and have
less variability in their materiality
judgments.
2. provide lower planning materiality
recommendations
3. indicate proposed adjustments
were more material
4. exert more effort on the
experimental task
-Accountable auditors feel more
responsibility for fraud detection
than anonymous auditors and they
brainstormed a greater number of
fraud related procedures.
- External auditors feel most
responsible for the detection of
financial statement fraud, whereas
internal auditors feel similar levels of
responsibility for detecting financial
statement fraud, misappropriation of
assets, and corruption.
- Accountability reduces the
frequency of the dilution effect
- However, when accountable and
the dilution effect does occur, the
magnitude of the effect is much
greater than when not accountable
- The accountability source
(management or audit committee)
had no effect on the findings related
to the frequency and magnitude of
the dilution effect.

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

Findings

Glover 1997

Journal of
Accounting
Research

156 auditors
(Big 6)

AR Risk
Assessment

- Assessment of risk of
material misstatement for
AR

Unknown

Gramling
1999

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

188 audit
managers
(Big 5)

Planning

- Adjustment to the
preliminary time budget

Known

Hoffman and
Patton 1997

Journal of
Accounting
Research

Fraud Risk
Assessment

- Assessment of fraud risk

Unknown

Johnson and
Kaplan 1991

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

44 advanced
in-charge
auditors
(Big 6)
101 auditors

Inventory
Obsolescence

- Risk of inventory
obsolescence

Unknown

- Auditors accountable for their work
have greater consistency in their risk
assessments and greater self-insight
into their decision processes.

Kaplan and
Lord 2001

International
Journal of
Auditing

30 experienced
audit managers

Reporting

- Likelihood of issuing an
unqualified opinion

Speculated

Kennedy
1993

Journal of
Accounting
Research

58 executive
MBA students
171 audit
managers

Reporting

- The likelihood the
company will fail

Unknown

Kennedy
1995

The Accounting
Review

147 MBA
students and
161 auditors

Reporting

- The likelihood the
company will fail

Unknown

- Auditors accountable to the
national office partner tend to have
their own judgments influenced by
what they perceive the partner's
preference to be.
- Accountable auditors did not
exhibit more thorough information
processing, as was expected.
- For participants unfamiliar with a
task, accountability mitigates recency
bias
- Participants familiar with the task
did not exhibit recency bias
- Finds that accountability does not
mitigate the curse of knowledge for
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- Finds that accountability has no
significant impact the dilution effect,
but provides some evidence that time
pressure reduces it.
- Auditors adjust the time budget in a
manner that aligns with the client's
preference
- Partner preference does not have an
impact on auditors’ time budget
adjustments
- Finds no evidence that
accountability exacerbates the
dilution effect.

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

86 executive
MBA students
and 322 audit
managers

Analytical
Review

Outcome Measure

Views

Findings

-Estimate of what others
would predict the
subsequent quarter sales to
be for a hypothetical
company
- Likelihood assessment as
to whether actual sales will
be as high or low as a
provided benchmark
- Number of plausible
explanations generated for
an unexpected increase in
sales

Unknown

experienced or inexperienced
participants

Unknown

- Novice auditors accountable for
their judgment process were
significantly more skeptical than
novice auditors accountable for their
judgment outcomes.
- Auditors anticipating review
provide more justifications for their
audit budget decision than those who
do not anticipate review, however the
final budget assessments do not vary
between groups.
- Auditors accountable to their firm
are less likely to issue an unqualified
opinion in an audit-client conflict
setting than auditors who were not
accountable

Kim and
Trotman
2014

Accounting and
Finance

31 auditors
(Australian
Big 4) and 32
recent
accounting
graduates

Analytical
Review

Koonce,
Anderson and
Marchant
1995

Journal of
Accounting
Research

202 advancedin-charge
auditors

Planning

- Revised time budget
amount
- Quantity and quality of
justifications provided for
time budget decision

Unknown

Lord 1992

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

30 experienced
audit managers

Reporting

- Likelihood of issuing an
unqualified opinion
- Yes/No decision on
whether to issue a qualified
opinion

Unknown

Messier,
Quick, and
Vandervelde
2014

Accounting,
Organizations
and Society

74 U.S.
auditors
47 Norwegian
auditors

Research and
Development
Task

-Decision regarding the
appropriate treatment
(capitalization vs. expense)
for R&D expenditures

Not
Applicable
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- In the low process accountability
condition, auditors recommend
different accounting treatments based
on the treatment of a similar event in
the prior year.
- In high process accountability
condition, auditors are not affected
by the prior year treatment of a
similar accounting event—high
process accountability mitigates the
status quo effect

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

Peecher 1996

Journal of
Accounting
Research

106 auditors
(Big 6)

Analytical
Review Task

-Likelihood assessment that
the client's explanation
regarding an income
increasing account
fluctuation accounted for
substantially all of the
fluctuation in the account
- Search for explanations
counter to the client's

Known

Peytcheva
and Gillett
2011

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

45 auditors
56 auditing
students

Fixed Asset Task

-Decision regarding the
appropriate treatment for a
fixed asset expenditure

Known
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Findings
- Auditors accountable to a partner
concerned with incurring
unnecessary cost in the investigation
of account fluctuations assess a
higher likelihood that the client's
explanation explains a majority of
the fluctuation in an account balance,
compared to those accountable to a
partner with a skepticism preference
- The effect of client preference on
auditor's likelihood assessment is
moderated by the level of client
integrity such that client preferences
mattered more in the high integrity
condition.
-Auditors who learn the views of the
audit partner only after having
reached their own judgment, report
that their own initial judgment had
matched the views of the audit
partner

Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

Findings

Peytcheva,
Wright, and
Majoor 2014

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

104 U.S.
auditors
48 Dutch
auditors

Lease
Classification
Task

-Feelings of process
accountability
-Epistemic motivation
-Demand for evidence

Not
Applicable

- Principle-based standards increase
auditors' perceptions of
accountability for the quality of the
process used to reach a decision
- Greater process accountability
results in higher epistemic
motivation, which is positively
associated with auditors’ demand for
diagnostic audit evidence and total
desired evidence

Rich 2004

The Accounting
Review

56 audit
managers

Analytical
Review

Known

- Accountability exacerbates the
effect of perceived probability of
preparer error on the extent of critical
review, which indirectly impacts the
amount of preparer follow up

Tan, Jubb,
and
Houghton
1997

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

70 audit
supervisors
and managers

Inventory
Obsolescence

- Agreement with preparer's
work
- Nature and extent of
elaboration
- Time estimate for preparer
to address review notes
- Risk of inventory
obsolescence
- Explanation of decision

Known

Tan and Kao
1999

Journal of
Accounting
Research

105
Singaporean
auditors (Big
6)

Internal Control
Task

- The number of correct
responses on internal control
evaluation tasks of high,
medium and low complexity

Unknown

- Auditors accountable to partners
whose views are known make risk
assessments significantly more in
line with the partner's views than
those accountable to a partner with
unknown views.
- Auditors accountable to a partner
with unknown views exert
significantly more effort than
auditors accountable to a partner
whose views are known
- Accountability does not improve
performance on low complexity tasks
- For medium and high complexity
tasks, accountability improves
performance only when auditors
have the appropriate level of
knowledge, or the appropriate level
of knowledge and problem solving
ability, respectively.
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Study

Journal

Participants

Task

Outcome Measure

Views

Tan, Ng, and
Mak 2002

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

105
Singaporean
auditors (Big
6)

Internal Control
Task

- The number of correct
responses on internal control
evaluation tasks of high,
medium, and low
complexity

Unknown

Tan and Tan
2008

Contemporary
Accounting
Research

87
Singaporean
audit seniors

Audit Evidence
Evaluation Task

- Likelihood assessment
related to the client’s
chances of winning a
significant contract

Unknown

Turner 2001

Journal of
Accounting
Research

89 senior
auditors and 3
audit managers
(Big 5)

AR
Collectability
Review Task

- Number of evidence items
examined
- Time spent reviewing
evidence selected
- Search pattern

Known and
Unknown
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Findings
- Accountability moderates the
relationship between task complexity
and performance
- Performance declines due to high
task complexity only occur when
either knowledge is high and
accountability is low, or
accountability is high and knowledge
is low.
- Find that reviewers and preparers
are unable to fully remove
invalidated information from their
judgments.
- Accountability moderates the effect
of the invalidated information for
reviewers, but not for preparers.
- Auditors accountable to a partner
concerned with incurring
unnecessary cost in evidence
investigation select fewer items and
conduct a more client prompted
evidence search than those
accountable to a partner with a
skepticism preference, or a partner
whose preferences are unknown
- Accountability preference has no
impact on time spent reviewing each
evidence item
- Provides some evidence that
accountability can instigate bias

Study
Wilks 2002

Journal
The Accounting
Review

Participants
60 audit
managers
(Big 5)
120 senior
auditors
(Big 5)

Task
Reporting

Outcome Measure
-Going concern assessment
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Views
Known

Findings
-Compared to auditors who learn of
the partner’s views after evaluating
evidence, auditors who learn of their
partner's views before evaluating
evidence
1. evaluate evidence as being more
consistent with their partner's view,
and
2. make going-concern judgments
that are more in line the partner's
view

STUDY TWO: EGO DEPLETION AND AUDITOR PERFORMANCE: THE
MODERATING EFFECT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
I. Introduction
Recent research in auditing has highlighted auditors’ susceptibility to ego depletion
(Kremin 2014; Bhaskar et al. 2016; Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b). Ego depletion is an
exhaustion of mental resources that allows an individual to exercise self-control (Baumeister et
al. 1998) or engage in active cognitive processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003). Various tasks deplete
these mental resources affecting an individual’s performance on subsequent depleting tasks. Ego
depletion is comparable to the exhaustion one feels from tests of physical strength. Muscles
weaken when engaging in exercise, diminishing an individual’s ability to perform well on other
immediate physical tasks (Baumeister et al. 2007). Psychology researchers have found a variety
of tasks to be mentally depleting, including those that involve making a choice (e.g. Schmeichel
et al. 2003; Vohs et al. 2008; Pocheptsova et al. 2009), engaging in intelligent thought, and
controlling emotions (e.g. Schmeichel et al. 2003).
A career in auditing demands the execution of a variety of depleting tasks (Kremin 2014;
Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b). Auditors must often make choices and engage in intelligent
thought when making audit decisions, such as determining the appropriate risk to assign to a
particular audit area, deciding which audit procedure to include in the audit program, or
identifying the proper accounting treatment for a complex accounting issue. Consequently, the
depleting nature of such tasks may hinder performance on subsequent tasks and ultimately
impact audit effectiveness. To the extent that these tasks affect audit quality, identifying factors
that can mitigate such effects is important.
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The purpose of this study is to investigate whether accountability moderates the negative
effects of ego depletion demonstrated in prior research (Kremin 2014; Bhaskar et al. 2016;
Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b). The strength model of self-control suggests depleted auditors will
perform worse than non-depleted auditors on a depleting task (Baumeister et al. 1998). This
decline in performance is due to diminished mental resources, which are necessary to execute
such tasks. However, psychology research indicates that individuals can overcome the effects of
ego depletion and has provided evidence of various mitigating mechanisms (Baumeister et al.
2007; Baumeister and Vohs 2007). For example, priming individuals with a belief in unlimited
willpower (Vohs et al. 2012), engaging in self-affirmation (Schmeichel and Vohs 2009), or
eliciting positive affect (Tice et al. 2007) have been shown to improve performance in depleted
individuals. While these mechanisms may translate to the auditing domain if implemented,
ideally a mechanism inherent to the audit environment may accomplish the same goal.
Accountability has the potential to be one such mechanism.
Accountability is defined as the “expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s
beliefs…” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255) and auditors are simultaneously accountable to a
variety of parties, such as supervisors, clients, and regulators (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994;
Buchman et al. 1996; Bierstaker and Wright 2001). Accountability theory posits that individuals
who feel accountable for their decisions will engage “…in an effortful and self-critical search for
reasons to justify their actions…” when the preference of the party to whom they are accountable
is unknown (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 263). Compared to those who do not feel accountable,
individuals who feel very accountable for their work are expected to use more cognitive effort in
their decision-making processes, which is triggered by their desire to please key constituencies
and identify a justifiable response for their decisions (Tetlock 1999). Pleasing important others is

59

expected to sufficiently motivate an individual to overcome the effects of depletion such that a
depleted auditor’s performance on a depleting task will not significantly differ from the
performance of a non-depleted auditor. Prior research in the area finds that accountability is
capable of moderating personal biases such as the recency effect (Kennedy 1993), the status quo
heuristic (Messier et al. 2013), and auditors’ tendency to include previously invalidated
information in their decision processes (Tan and Tan 2008).
Two experiments are conducted to examine the moderating effect of accountability on the
relationship between ego depletion and performance. The initial experiment produced surprising
results; thus, a follow up experiment was conducted to further investigate the unexpected
findings. Both experiments are 2 x 2 between-participants experimental designs with the same
independent and dependent variables.16 The independent variables are depletion (present or
absent) and accountability (present or absent).17 In both experiments, to manipulate depletion,
participants in the depleted condition first complete a task designed to induce depletion, and then
complete the experimental task, an audit risk assessment. In the initial experiment, participants in
the non-depleted condition begin with the experimental task. In the follow up experiment, the
depletion task was lengthened for participants in the depleted condition, and participants in the
non-depleted condition begin with a non-depleting task prior to the experimental task.
Participants are either accountable or not accountable for their performance on the audit risk

16

Minor modifications were made to the experimental design to help further understand the initial findings. These
modifications are discussed in more detail in the Experimental Method and Design section.
17
While accountability is a natural element of the auditing environment, and the complete absence of accountability
is unattainable, the accountability pressure that auditors feel may vary due to a variety of factors. For example,
auditors feel less accountable when reviews are conducted electronically as opposed to face-to-face (Brazel et al.
2004). Further, accountability pressure varies depending on the accountability mechanism employed. Auditors
proposed higher materiality thresholds when they only expected their work to be reviewed, compared to auditors
who were also required to justify their planning materiality decisions and auditors who expected to receive feedback
on their decisions (DeZoort et al. 2006). In situations where auditors are heavily depleted but performance on a
depleting task is important, implementing high levels of accountability pressure may be beneficial.
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assessment exercise. Accountable participants are required to provide their name, provide
justification for each of their risk assessment decisions, and sign off on their work. They are also
told that their work will be reviewed. Prior research manipulates accountability in a similar
manner by requiring participants to provide their names and telling participants that their work
will be reviewed (e.g. Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Koonce et al. 1995; Peecher 1996) and
requiring the participants to provide justifications for their decisions (DeZoort et al.2006). The
non-accountable participants are required to identify the appropriate risk assessments, but their
responses are anonymous and no justification or sign-off is required. The dependent variable of
interest is the participant’s performance on an audit risk assessment task.
Depleted participants are predicted to perform worse on the audit risk assessment
exercise than non-depleted participants. The audit risk assessment exercise is expected to draw
on the participants’ self-control resources as they must engage in active cognitive processing to
determine the appropriate risk assessment given current year information about a hypothetical
audit client. Depleted participants should perform worse due to the availability of fewer selfcontrol resources necessary to execute the task. Accountability should moderate this predicted
discrepancy in performance, as the requirement to justify their decisions and being personally
linked to their performance should sufficiently motivate depleted participants to overcome the
effects of depletion.
Surprisingly, the results from both experiments indicate that depletion improves rather
than hinders performance when participants are not accountable for their work. Thus,
accountability is unable to offset the performance decline that depletion was expected to induce.
The results suggest both accountability and depletion result in improved performance. However,
the combined effect of both depletion and accountability is not additive in that performance
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improvements are greater when auditors are both accountable and depleted; accountability and
depletion appear to be substitutes for improving auditor performance. While contrary to
expectations, this finding suggests that the strength model of self-control may not be applicable
to all settings as depleted auditors did not experience the expected performance declines.
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature. First, it contributes to
the recent research on ego depletion in auditing. Prior research suggests that auditors are
susceptible to depletion (Kremin 2014; Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b), particularly those with
high levels of trait professional skepticism and those who have strong professional identification
(Bhaskar et al. 2016). This study provides evidence that ego depletion may not always hinder
auditor performance but may improve it as well. Second, this study contributes to auditing
research on accountability that investigates whether accountability moderates certain personal
biases. Specifically, this study suggests that accountability does not influence the effect that
depletion has on performance. Instead, it acts as a substitute for depletion due to depletion’s
ability to improve performance. Lastly, this study contributes to the psychology research on ego
depletion by demonstrating the ability of ego depletion to improve performance. It also extends
psychology research that investigates moderators of depletion by considering a moderator not
previously evaluated in the psychology literature.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the
background literature and hypotheses development. Section III discusses the experimental
method and design and section IV provides the experimental results. The conclusion and
opportunities for future research are provided in section V.
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II. Background and Hypotheses Development
Ego Depletion
The strength model of self-control suggests individuals have a finite number of resources
available to execute self-control (Baumeister et al. 1998; Muraven and Baumeister 2000). Selfcontrol is the “capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring them in line with
standards such as ideals, values, morals and social expectations.…” (Baumeister et al. 2007,
351). Many activities such as resisting temptation (Baumeister et al. 1998), controlling emotion
(Baumeister et al. 1998; Schmeichel et al. 2003; Muraven and Slessareva 2003; Vohs et al.
2012), or maintaining attention (Schmeichel et al. 2003; Boucher and Kofos 2012; Vohs et al.
2012) deplete these self-control resources. However, more recently, research has shown that
certain cognitive tasks such as making choices (Vohs et al. 2008) and executing controlled
cognitive processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003) draw on these same resources, thus depleting
individuals engaging in such tasks. Furthermore, psychology research continually supports the
notion that individuals who utilize their limited resources when executing a depleting task suffer
performance declines on subsequent tasks that rely on those same self-control resources (e.g.
Baumeister et al. 1998; Wallace and Baumeister 2002; Schmeichel et al. 2003; Vohs et al. 2008).
Accounting researchers have recently investigated the impact of depletion in an auditing
context and have found depletion to have detrimental effects on auditor performance. Kremin
(2014) finds that depleted auditors are less likely to correctly identify errors in an analytical
procedures task when a client is inherently low risk. However, depleted auditors in a high-risk
setting are able to overcome the effects of depletion and correctly identify more errors in the
analytical task than those in the low risk setting. Auditors with high trait skepticism and those
with strong professional identification are more susceptible to the effects of depletion,
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highlighting a potential downside of characteristics generally seen as favorable in the audit
environment (Bhaskar et al. 2016). Hurley (2015a) also shows that various types of depleting
tasks result in differing levels of depletion. Specifically, he investigates how two types of
auditing tasks compare to a depleting task commonly used in psychology. He finds that the two
auditing tasks result in more depletion than does the depleting psychology task. Auditors also
exhibit higher levels of depletion during busy season than at other times during the year
suggesting an accumulation effect, which does not allow self-control resources to be restored
over a 24-hour time span (Hurley 2015b).
Consistent with prior accounting research and most relevant to the auditing context is the
notion that the mental resources utilized for self-control are employed in tasks requiring
controlled cognitive processing. Related to controlled cognitive processing, Schmeichel et al.
(2003) state “…using logic to draw conclusions and implications from ideas, extrapolating from
known facts to make estimates about unknowns, and generating novel ideas may require active
self-control.” (p. 33). Schmeichel et al. (2003) suggest that tasks requiring the use of rote
memory or execution that is relatively automatic would likely not draw on the mental resources
that are necessary for self-control. However, those tasks requiring the application of significant
cognitive effort, such as logical reasoning or problem solving, are expected to draw heavily on
self-control resources. Individuals must decide how to approach such tasks and consider various
information cues to reach a conclusion.
Auditors frequently engage in activities that require significant amounts of cognitive
effort. These activities include tasks that require auditors to consider various pieces of
information to formulate a reasonable response. Examples of such tasks include determining the
appropriate risk to assign to a particular audit area, deciding which audit procedure to include in
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the audit program, or identifying the proper accounting treatment for a complex accounting
issue. Less depleting auditing tasks are those that require less cognitive processing such as audit
testing that requires supporting documents to be reviewed for certain characteristics or the
agreement of information between multiple documents. Examples of these include control testing
that requires the auditor to evaluate whether checks over a specified dollar threshold have dual
signatures, or substantive fixed asset testing that requires the auditor to vouch a sample of fixed
asset additions to their related invoices. These tasks require the auditor to review supporting
documentation for certain characteristics but do not demand the level of cognitive effort required
when employing critical thinking skills.
Consistent with prior research and the strength model of self-control, depleted auditors
are predicted to perform worse on a depleting task than auditors who are not depleted.
H1:

Performance on a depleting task will be worse for depleted auditors than for nondepleted auditors.

Research also finds that the effects of ego depletion can be temporarily overcome if
individuals are sufficiently motivated.18 Research shows that compensating individuals for
performance (Muraven and Slessareva 2003) or even having them simply think of money
(Boucher and Kofos 2012) can offset performance declines caused by depletion. Psychology
research also suggests depleted individuals will perform at a higher level than they would
otherwise when they are told that the outcome of the task they are completing will either benefit
themselves or another individual (Muraven and Slessareva 2003). Depletion is not only
overcome through sufficient motivation, but simply altering a person’s mindset or mood can also

18

Motivation is broadly defined as “…any sort of general drive or inclination to do something” (Baumeister and
Vohs 2007, 2).
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have an impact. Priming individuals with belief in unlimited willpower (Vohs et al. 2012), selfaffirmation (Schmeichel and Vohs 2009), and positive affect (Tice et al. 2007) can diminish the
effects of depletion. While certain moderators identified in the psychology literature may have
similar effects when implemented in an auditing context, identifying a natural element of the
auditing environment that can accomplish the same goal is ideal. Accountability may be one
such element.
Accountability is motivating due to the desire for individuals to reach a defensible
conclusion that will please important others. Accountability to parties whose preferences are
unknown will result in more cognitively complex decision making processes as individuals will
attempt to consider various perspectives when making their decision and formulate responses to
any objections that evaluative others might raise (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). This response stems
from a core assumption of accountability theory—that individuals seek social approval and
therefore strive to reach decisions that are justifiable and will be viewed favorably by key parties
(Tetlock 1999).
In an auditing context, accountability is expected to motivate depleted auditors to achieve
performance levels more consistent with their non-depleted counterparts. Accountability is
particularly important in the audit environment, as auditors manage multiple accountability
relationships with various parties (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996;
Bierstaker and Wright 2001). When one of these parties determines that the auditor’s
performance is unsatisfactory, the auditor may incur negative consequences. For example, a
supervisor may react to unsatisfactory performance by writing a poor performance review, or a
client may request the auditor be removed from the engagement. The desire to please these key
parties and avoid such negative consequences is expected to incentivize auditors to overcome the
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effects of depletion and perform at a level higher than those who are depleted but not
accountable for performance.
Prior research in accounting finds that accountability influences auditor decision-making.
For example, auditors accountable for their decisions have greater consensus in their risk
assessments related to inventory obsolescence. They are also more aware of their decisionmaking process indicating increased cognitive effort (Johnson and Kaplan 1991). Auditors also
alter their testing strategy in an audit planning task when they expect their work to be reviewed
and they do not know the preferences of their reviewer, compared to auditors who do not
anticipate a review (Asare et al. 2000). 19
Given that accountability influences how individuals make decisions by inducing a more
effortful decision process, accountability is expected to motivate depleted auditors to overcome
the effects of depletion and perform at a level comparable to non-depleted auditors and perform
at a level substantially better than depleted auditors who are not accountable.
H2: Accountability moderates the effect of ego depletion on performance such that
auditors who are depleted and not accountable for their work will perform poorer than
those who are depleted and accountable and those who are not depleted.
III. Experimental Method and Design
Design and Procedure
The initial experiment involves a 2 x 2 between-participants design that investigates the
potential moderating effect of accountability on ego depletion. Depletion and accountability are

19

No main effect for accountability is hypothesized as prior literature that has shown the positive effects of
accountability when accountable to parties with unknown preferences (e.g. Asare et al. 2000, DeZoort et al. 2006;
Tan and Kao 1999).
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the independent variables, both of which are manipulated as present or absent. The dependent
variable is participants’ performance on an audit risk assessment exercise.
Participants in the depletion condition received an initial depleting task adapted from the
depletion manipulation task used by Kremin (2014). The task required participants to count the
number of times “e” appeared in a passage that they were provided. They then received a second
passage and counted only those “e”s that were not followed by a vowel or a vowel was not “one
letter removed from the ‘e’ in either direction.” (Kremin 2014, 44). This required the use of selfcontrol resources to override the initial rule of counting all “e”s, thus depleting the participants’
self-control resources. Similar tasks are used in psychology research (e.g. Tice et al. 2007) and a
recent meta-analysis found this type of task to be most effective at inducing depletion (Hagger et
al. 2010).20 Participants in the non-depleted condition received the depleting task subsequent to
the audit task in order to maintain consistent task duration across treatments.
Participants also completed an audit task for which they were either accountable or not.
The accountability manipulation applied only to the audit task; and, for those participants in the
depletion condition, the information pertaining to the accountability manipulation was provided
to participants after the e-counting task. The audit task consisted of an audit risk assessment
activity adopted from Bhaskar et al. (2016). Participants made a series of risk assessments for a
hypothetical audit client. They were given current year client information relevant to the risk
assessments being made, as well as the prior year risk assessments and justifications.
Participants utilized the current year client information to assess client risk on a scale of 1 to 7

20

In studies related to ego depletion, the presence of depletion is often tested utilizing performance on subsequent
tasks (e.g. Schmeichel and Vohs 2009, Moller et al. 2006; Hurley 2015a). In this experimental setting, an additional
task designed to measure depletion would further deplete the participants, thus influencing their performance on the
audit risk assessment exercise. As such, the performance on the audit risk assessment exercise is expected to be
indicative of depletion. There are no previously validated scales specifically designed to measure depletion.
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across a variety of factors. In the accountability condition, participants were required to provide
their name, justifications for their risk assessment decisions, and sign off on their work.
Furthermore, they were told their work would be reviewed. Accounting research on
accountability often manipulates accountability by asking participants to provide their names and
informing them that their work will be reviewed (Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Koonce et al.
1995; Peecher 1996) and requiring them to provide justifications for their decisions (DeZoort et
al. 2006). Participants who were not accountable for their work on the audit risk assessment task
were told their responses would be reviewed but that the responses would not be associated with
their name, and they were not required to justify their decision or sign off on their work. Figure
2 provides an example of the risk assessment exercise for the accountable condition. The nonaccountable condition contained the same information except it excludes the two far right
columns that require the justification and sign off.
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Figure 2: Risk Assessment Example- Accountable Condition
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Dependent Variables
Performance is assessed as the number of correct responses identified by each participant
on the audit risk assessment exercise. Participants are provided prior year risk assessments and
must determine whether the current year risk has increased or decreased from prior year, or
stayed the same based on the current year company information they are provided. A response is
deemed to be correct when the participant identifies the appropriate directional change or
appropriately suggests no change from prior year is necessary. Consistent with Bhaskar et al.
(2016), each correct response receives one point and an incorrect response receives zero points.
Participants received an aggregate score of all correct answers ranging from 0 to 8.21

Control Variables
Participants also completed a post experimental questionnaire to assess their trait selfcontrol (Tangney et al. 2004), perception of depletion (Clarkson et al. 2010), and level of trait
skepticism (Hurtt 2010). These variables are included as potential control variables as they are
expected to impact participants’ performance on an audit risk assessment exercise regardless of
the participants’ depletion and accountability conditions. Lastly, participants responded to
demographic questions about their gender, age, and professional work experience.

21

The risk assessment exercise was shortened from 15 risk assessments to 10 risk assessments due to time
constraints. Furthermore, two risk assessments were eliminated from analysis. One was removed because the
appropriate directional change for the assessment was unclear. The last risk assessment was removed from analysis
because over half of the participants in all conditions responded incorrectly. Including this final risk assessment in
the analysis does not quantitatively alter the results.
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Participants
Participants were undergraduate and graduate accounting students. One hundred and
twenty-seven participants were recruited from four undergraduate auditing classes and one
graduate auditing class. Each student was compensated $10 for their time.22 The experiment was
administered in the University’s behavioral lab via Qualtrics. Participants signed up for sessions
in the lab when they were recruited, and they were randomly assigned to one of four conditions
during their session. As the experiment was expected to take 45 minutes of the students’ time,
the behavioral lab was utilized to provide a controlled setting with minimal distractions that
allowed participants to apply an appropriate level of focus.
Students are deemed to be appropriate participants for this task, as they are expected to be
as susceptible to the effects of ego depletion as practicing auditors. Libby et al. (2002) suggest
that student participants are appropriate in studies investigating individuals’ cognitive abilities.
Students are expected to be able to complete the audit risk assessment task given their enrollment
in an auditing course. Furthermore, Bhaskar et al. (2016) developed the risk assessment exercise
with the assistance of firm personnel who considered the exercise to be consistent with the type
of task a staff level auditor would perform. They also successfully utilized this risk assessment
exercise with student participants.
While the independent variables were manipulated based on what the participants were
required to do, as opposed to what they read, it was important that the participants paid
appropriate attention to the tasks at hand. Accountable participants were required to provide
justifications for their risk assessments while non-accountable participants were not. As such,

22

All but three students also received extra credit from their professors for participating, as one professor did not
offer extra credit to students who participated.
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participants were asked if they were “…required to provide an explanation for… [the] current
year risk assessment and sign off on [the] assessment?” In total, five participants in the nonaccountable group failed the manipulation check and were removed from the analysis.
Additionally, three participants in the accountable condition did not provide their full name as
requested, but instead provided their initials. As such, they were also removed due to concern
that they would not have the same feeling of accountability as those individuals who provided
their full names.
Depleted participants were required to complete an “e” counting task prior to completing
the risk assessment exercise. It is important that the participants paid sufficient attention to this
task. Observations were removed for participants who were two standard deviations removed
from the mean number of “e”s identified on the second portion of the “e” task and two standard
deviations removed from the mean time taken on the second portion of the “e” task.23
Participants were eliminated based on both number identified and time in an attempt to exclude
those individuals who may not have taken the task seriously. Specifically, the criteria attempted
to capture those individuals who counted all “e”s rather than following the specific rule provided
on the second passage, those who simply input a number so they could proceed without
appropriately completing the task, those who took so little time it is questionable whether they
took the task seriously, and those took so much time there is concern they may have been
distracted from the task at hand. Four additional observations were removed due to the “e” task.
One hundred fifteen responses were left after removing these twelve responses. Due to the
unequal cell size, and failing the assumption of homogeneity of variances (p = 0.005), an

23

This analysis focused on the second portion of the “e” task, as this was the most cognitively taxing portion.
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additional 11 observations were randomly removed to equalize cell sizes, leaving a total of 104
observations for hypotheses testing.
Participants’ demographic information is presented in Table 2.24 Approximately 55
percent of the participants included in the analysis were male, while approximately 45 percent
were female. Seventy-seven percent of participants were between the ages of 21 and 25 and
approximately 21 percent had previous auditing experience.
Table 2: Initial Experiment-Demographic Profile of Participants
(n = 104)
n (%) b
Age:
18-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
40+
Prefer not to answer

b

24

2 (1.9)
80 (76.9)
15 (14.4)
4 (3.9)
-2 (1.9)
1 (1.0)

Gender:
Male
Female

57 (54.8)
47 (45.2)

Auditing Work Experience:
Yes
No

22 (21.2)
82 (78.8)

Type of Auditing Experience:
Internal Audit
External Audit
Both

1 (4.5)
20 (91.0)
1 (4.5)

Years of Auditing Experience:
<1
1-2
3-4
5+

20 (91.0)
1 (4.5)
1 (4.5)
--

Provides the demographic information for the participants that were used in the data analysis.

Demographic variables were evaluated for differences across conditions and no differences were identified.
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IV. Results
Test of Hypotheses
H1 predicts that performance on a depleting task will be worse for depleted auditors than
for non-depleted auditors. Figure 3 Panel A provides a graph of the predicted results and Panel
B provides a graph of the actual results.

Number of Correct Directional Changes

Panel A: Predicted Result
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Not Depleted
Accountable

Depleted
Not Accountable

Number of Correct Directional Changes

Panel B: Actual Results
7

6.54
6.12

6.5
6
5.5

6.04
4.96

5
4.5
4
3.5
3
Not Depleted

Depleted

Accountable

Not Accountable

Figure 3: Initial Experiment-Predicted and Actual Results for Number of Correct Directional
Changes
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Performance is assessed by counting the total number of correct directional changes
identified by each participant. For the total number of correct directional responses, I run an
ANCOVA and control for trait professional skepticism and trait self-control.25 Table 3 Panel A
provides descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics indicate that individuals in the not
depleted/accountable condition identify the most correct responses (mean = 6.54). Overall, the
accountable participants (mean = 6.33) appear to perform better than those who are not
accountable (mean = 5.50), and depleted participants (mean = 6.08) appear to perform better than
those who are not depleted (mean = 5.75).

25

Covariates were evaluated by regressing all potential control variables on the dependent variable of interest and
running an ANCOVA that included all possible control variables. Trait skepticism and trait self-control were the
only potential control variables that were significant (p ≤.05) or marginally significant (p ≤.10) in one or both
models.
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Table 3: Initial Experiment- Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses- Correct Directional
Change of Risk Assessment
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Number of Correct Directional Changes Mean
[Standard Deviation]
Number of Correct Directional Changes
Source of Variation

Accountable

Not Accountable

Depleted

6.12
[1.80]
n =26

6.04
[2.16]
n =26

6.08
[1.97]
n =52

Not Depleted

6.54
[1.33]
n =26

4.96
[2.58]
n =26

5.75
[2.19]
n= 52

6.33
[1.58]
n =52

5.50
[2.42]
n =52

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of Variation

df

MSE

F-statistic

p-value

a

1
1
1
1
1
98

4.724
12.711
12.890
17.277
23.892
3.872

1.220
3.283
3.329
4.462
6.171

0.272
0.073
0.071
0.037
0.015

Depletion
Accountability a
Depletion X Accountability
Trait Self-Control
Professional Skepticism
Error
Panel C: Planned Comparison Tests a

H1: Depleted < Not Depleted (+1,-1)
H2: Depleted/Not Accountable < Depleted/Accountable,
Not Depleted/Not Accountable, Not Depleted/Accountable
(-3,+1,+1,+1)

T-statistic

p-value b

-1.090

0.139

-.651

0.258

Panel D: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects a
Source of Variation

df

F-statistic

p-value

Effects of Depletion given no Accountability
Effects of Depletion given Accountability
Effects of Accountability given no Depletion
Effects of Accountability given Depletion

1
1
1
1

4.299
.253
6.566
.000

0.041
0.616
0.012
0.990

a
b

Results include the covariates of trait professional skepticism and trait self-control
Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent
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The results of the ANCOVA are provided in Table 3 Panel B. Although not
hypothesized, the results suggest there is a main effect for accountability. This finding supports
prior research that also finds accountability to improve performance (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; Tan
and Kao 1999). H1 predicts that the depleted participants will perform worse on the risk
assessment exercise than the non-depleted participants. In the ANCOVA, the main effect for
depletion is not significant (p = 0.272, two-tailed). However, due to the directional nature of the
hypothesis, a planned comparison is conducted. This analysis also finds an insignificant main
effect for depletion (p = 0.139, one-tailed).26 Participants in the depleted and non-depleted
groups did not identify a significantly different number of correct directional changes on the risk
assessment exercise. As such, H1 is not supported.
Table 3 Panel C presents the result of a planned comparison that tests the hypothesized
interaction (H2). The finding indicates that the depleted/non-accountable condition does not
perform significantly worse than the other three conditions (p = 0.258, one-tailed). As such, H2
is not supported. However, due to the marginally significant interaction identified in the
ANCOVA (p = 0.071, two-tailed), the simple effects are analyzed to investigate the nature of the
interaction.
The simple effects analysis is presented in Table 3 Panel D. The results suggest that
accountability affects performance when participants are not depleted (p = 0.012, two-tailed), but
accountability does not affect performance when they are depleted (p = 0.990, two-tailed).

The bottom two-thirds of participants who identified the lowest number of “e”s on the depleting portion of the etask were analyzed separately. This was done try and capture a subset of participants who may be more depleted
than the others. The top one-third of participants were excluded, as those who input a higher number may have tried
to count all “e”s and ignored the specific rule associated with the second portion of the e-task. The results of the
analysis with the bottom two-thirds of participants present a pattern consistent with the reported findings.
Furthermore, the results reveal significant main effects for depletion.
26
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Participants who are not depleted identify significantly more correct directional changes when
they are accountable than when they are not. The positive effect of accountability on
performance is consistent with prior accounting literature that finds accountability to parties with
unknown views positively influences auditor decision-making (e.g. Ashton 1990; Tan and Kao
1999). Furthermore, depletion caused a significant difference in the number of correct directional
changes participants identified when the participants were not accountable for their work (p =
0.041, two-tailed). Depleted participants who were not accountable identified significantly more
correct directional changes than non-depleted participants who were not accountable.
Overall, the findings do not provide support for H1 and H2. While the ANCOVA
indicates a marginally significant interaction, the interaction is not in the manner expected.
Surprisingly, the simple effect analysis reveals that participants’ who were depleted showed an
improvement, rather than decline, in their performance. The nature of the interaction indicates
that both accountability and depletion improve performance. However, the effect of both
treatments is not additive in that performance is significantly better when both depletion and
accountability are present. Rather, depletion and accountability appear to act as substitutes. The
presence of either accountability or depletion improves performance to a similar extent.

Experimental Modifications and Additional Analysis

Recent research has questioned whether the phenomenon of ego depletion is a reality. A
meta-analysis of prior research was conducted and ultimately found little evidence that ego
depletion exists (Carter et al. 2015). Carter et al. (2015) utilize new statistical procedures and
address limitations of a 2010 meta-analysis of ego depletion research (Hagger et al. 2010); they
challenge years of research on the strength model of ego depletion. As a result, Hagger and
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Chatzisarantis (2016) conduct a replication study utilizing experimental materials adopted from
Sripada et al. (2014). The findings of this replication study also provide little evidence of the ego
depletion effect.
Due to the recent research questioning the strength model of ego depletion (e.g. Carter et
al. 2015; Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2016) and the unexpected experimental results reported
above, an additional experiment was conducted to refine some experimental design choices to
see if the positive effect of depletion continues to hold. Two main changes were made. First, the
depletion task was lengthened. Initially, this task was shortened from the version used by Kremin
(2014) due to time constraints. As Kremin (2014) found the e-task to be depleting, use of the
full-length version alleviates concern that the unexpected findings are attributable to the
shortened task. Second, the non-depleted group was also provided a version of the e-counting
task that was not expected to cause depletion. In the initial experiment, the non-depleted group
was not provided with an e-counting task, and instead started with the risk assessment exercise
used for the dependent variable. Providing the non-depleted group with a similar task ensures
that the improved performance seen in the depleted participants is not due to the mere presence
of an initial task, but rather, due to the nature of the task provided. The risk assessment task and
the way in which the dependent variable is calculated do not differ from the initial experiment.
Participants were recruited from three undergraduate auditing courses, and were provided extra
credit for their participation. Consistent with the prior experiment, observations were eliminated
for participants who failed the manipulation check regarding the requirement for justification (1
participant), and outliers associated with the number of “e”s identified on the second portion of
the depleting e-counting task (2 participants) and the amount of time taken on the second portion
of the depleting e-counting task (2 participants). This reduced the sample from 67 observation to
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a final sample of 62 observations. Demographic information associated with the sample is
provided in Table 4. Most participants were between the ages of 21 and 25 (61.2%), with slightly
more males (53.2%) than females (46.8%) participating in this study. Only 9.6% of the
participants had any auditing work experience.
Table 4: Follow Up Experiment- Demographic Profile of Participants
(n = 62)
n (%) b
Age:
18-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
40+
Prefer not to answer

b

2 (3.2)
28 (61.3)
6 (9.7)
3 (4.8)
5 (8.1)
6 (9.7)
2 (3.2)

Gender:
Male
Female

33 (53.2)
29 (46.8)

Auditing Work Experience:
Yes
No

6 (9.7)
56 (90.3)

Type of Auditing Experience:
Internal Audit
External Audit
Both

1 (16.7)
5 (83.3)
--

Years of Auditing Experience:
<1
1-2
3-4
5+

6 (9.7)
----

Provides the demographic information for the participants that were used in the data analysis.
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The primary dependent variable for this experiment is the number of correct directional
responses identified by each participant on the audit risk assessment exercise. This number could
range from 0-8. Graphical depictions of the predicted and actual results are provided in Figure 4
Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Table 5 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for each
condition, while Panel B provide the ANCOVA results.27 The ANCOVA model controls for trait
self-control. While trait skepticism and perception of depletion were also evaluated as potential
covariates, they did not significantly impact the dependent variable.

Although the Levene’s test associated with the ANCOVA is significant at .032, Field (2009) advises also
evaluating the Hartley’s Fmax as he suggests “Levene’s test is not necessarily the best way to judge whether variances
are unequal enough to cause problems” (p. 405). Based on this test, I find that the difference in variance is not cause
for concern.
27
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Number of Correct Directional Changes

Panel A: Predicted Result
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Not Depleted

Depleted

Accountable

Not Accountable

Number of Correct Directional Changes

Panel B: Actual Results
6.5
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5.81
4.93

5
4.5
4
3.5
3
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Figure 4: Follow Up Experiment- Predicted and Actual Results for Number of Correct
Directional Changes
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Table 5: Follow Up Experiment- Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses- Correct
Directional Change of Risk Assessment
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Number of Correct Directional Changes - Mean
[Standard Deviation]
Number of Correct Directional Changes
Source of Variation

Accountable

Not Accountable

Depleted

5.814
[1.424]
n=16

5.857
[2.214]
n=14

5.833
[1.802]
n=30

Not Depleted

5.941
[1.249]
n=17

4.933
[2.120]
n=15

5.469
[1.759]
n=32

5.879
[1.317]
n=33

5.379
[2.178]
n=29

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of Variation

df

MSE

F-statistic

p-value

Depletion a
Accountability a
Depletion X Accountability
Trait Self-Control
Error

1
1
1
1
57

4.955
2.937
2.609
18.305
2.872

1.725
1.023
.908
6.373

0.194
0.316
0.345
0.014

T-statistic

p-valueb

1.28

0.103

-.670

0.253

1.378

0.087

1.605

0.057

Panel C: Planned Comparison Test a
Source of Variation
H1: Depleted < Not Depleted (+1,-1)
H2: Depleted/Not Accountable < Depleted/Accountable,
Not Depleted/Not Accountable, Not Depleted/Accountable
(-3,+1,+1,+1)
No Depletion/No Accountability< No
Depletion/Accountability
No Depletion/No Accountability< Depletion/No
Accountability
a
b

Results include the covariates of trait self-control
Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent
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The results of the follow up experiment suggest that the main effect for depletion is not
significant (p = 0.194, two-tailed) and there is no significant interaction (p = 0.345, two-tailed).
However, a planned comparison is conducted to test the directional nature the hypothesis related
to the main effect for depletion. The depleted condition is assigned a contrast weight of +1, and
the non-depleted condition is assigned a contrast weight of -1. The hypothesized interaction is
also analyzed using a planned comparison. The depleted/non-accountable condition is given a
contrast weight of -3, while all other conditions are given a contrast weight of +1. The results of
the planned comparisons are presented in Table 5 Panel C. The findings suggest there is no
significant main effect for depletion (p = 0.103, one-tailed), and no significant interaction (p =
0.253, one-tailed). These findings are consistent with the results of the initial experiment.
Given the results of the prior experiment and the few studies that suggest depletion may
improve performance on subsequent tasks (Converse and DeShon 2009; DeWitte et al. 2009), I
conduct two additional planned comparison tests to evaluate whether the significant simple
effects identified in the prior experiment are present in the current data. The first test evaluates
whether depletion improves performance given no accountability, and the second investigates
whether accountability improves performance when depletion is not present. The results of these
planned comparisons are also provided in Table 5, Panel C. The results indicate a marginally
significant difference in performance for those individuals who are depleted and those who are
not, provided no accountability pressure (p = 0.087, one-tailed). Depleted individuals performed
better than those who were not depleted. Furthermore, accountability improved the performance
of individuals who were not depleted, as there was a marginally significant difference in
performance between non-depleted participants who were accountable and non-depleted
participants who were not accountable (p = 0.057, one-tailed). Overall, the results from the

85

second experiment support the results from the first experiment and provide evidence that
depletion may improve performance when completing an auditing task.

V. Conclusion and Opportunities for Future Research
The results of this study suggest that depletion and accountability do not interact in the
expected manner. Absent accountability, depletion was found to improve, rather than hinder
performance. Given this finding, it is not possible to evaluate whether accountability is able to
offset performance declines associated with depletion. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that
both accountability and depletion improve performance. The combined effect of depletion and
accountability, however, do not improve performance beyond the performance of participants
who were only accountable and those who were only depleted. This indicates that depletion and
accountability act as substitutes for improving performance.
These findings are counter to the significant stream of research on the strength model of
self-control (e.g. Baumeister et al. 1998, Baumeister et al. 2007), as well as the current
accounting literature on ego depletion. Current research in accounting provides some evidence
that depletion may hinder subsequent performance. Kremin (2014) finds that depletion hinders
auditors’ abilities to properly identify an error in an analytical procedure, but only when client
risk is low. Bhaskar et al. (2016) performed two experiments to investigate the interactive effect
of trait skepticism and depletion and professional identity and depletion. In one experiment, they
find that depletion does hinder performance when depletion was induced by requiring
participants to resist temptation.28

28

It should be noted, however, that Bhaskar et al. (2016) conduct another experiment where they use a depleting
task that involves switching mindsets, but it is not a task previously used in the psychology literature. In this
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As previously discussed, recent research has challenged the strength model of ego
depletion, with some research suggesting that there are circumstances under which exertion of
self-control resources improves performance, which would be consistent with the results of this
study (Converse and DeShon 2009; DeWitte et al. 2009). Researchers propose alternative
theories that may help to explain the performance improvement experienced by depleted
individuals.
DeWitte et al. (2009) draw on cognitive control theory to suggest that when consecutive
tasks of self-control utilize similar self-control processes, performance improves on the second
self-control task. Converse and DeShon (2009) also indicate that significant exertion of selfcontrol resources may improve performance on subsequent tasks. They adhere to the selfadaptation view of self-control and speculate that the improved performance is attributable to
one’s ability to adapt to the level of self-control that is required of them. However, in their
experiments, they find this adaptation generally occurs over multiple consecutive tasks requiring
self-control, as opposed to just one initial self-control task.
There a couple of additional plausible explanations for the unexpected results in this
study. The initial depletion task may have engaged participants’ system two by requiring
participants to utilize more effortful cognitive processing. The use of this system then carried
over to the risk assessment exercise, resulting in more effortful cognitive processing on the
second task and thus improved performance. Those individuals who received either no initial
task, or received the non-depleting e-counting task, likely relied on their default system one to
complete the risk assessment exercise. This system, however, tends to be cognitively lazy and

experiment, they found no main effect for depletion. Interestingly, they find some evidence that the depleting task
did improve performance for participants with low levels of professional identity.

87

operates more automatically, often utilizing heuristics in decision making. As such, participants
utilizing system one exerted less cognitive effort on the risk assessment exercise resulting in
poorer performance.
Another possible explanation is that the depleted participants may have perceived the risk
assessment exercise to be more enjoyable relative to the monotonous, yet challenging nature of
the depletion task. Given that participants are accounting students, it is reasonable to assume they
may have enjoyed the risk assessment exercise. While the non-depleted participants may have
also found the risk assessment task to be enjoyable, their frame of reference would be different.
They may not appreciate the risk assessment exercise to the same extent as the depleted
participants. Although no definitive conclusion can be made as to whether these proposed
explanations can be attributed to the unexpected findings in this study, additional research should
continue to investigate why depletion sometimes helps rather than hinders performance.
This study contributes to the literature on ego depletion in that it helps to extend our
understanding of ego depletion in an auditing context. It provides evidence that depletion may
improve performance in certain circumstances. The auditing domain is unique such that certain
cognitive phenomenon may not translate to an audit setting, and it is important to explore where
these differences occur. Furthermore, this study also adds to the conflicting psychology literature
on ego depletion by highlighting a scenario where the strength model of self-control does not
hold true. It provides further evidence that the strength model of self-control does not apply to all
situations, thus future research should continue to refine the strength model of self-control and
identify conditions to which the theory is applicable. Lastly, this study contributes to the
literature on accountability by investigating the ability of accountability to moderate another
cognitive phenomenon, ego depletion.
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As with any study, there are limitations that must be discussed. The use of an e-counting
task to induce depletion is one of a variety of exercises expected to be depleting. As such, it is
possible that the results may differ when utilizing an alternative depleting task. Furthermore, ego
depletion research commonly uses the sequential task setting, as was done in this study. We are
unable to definitively state whether the depleting task caused depletion, but we infer the
depletion due to the change in performance on the secondary task; in this instance, the risk
assessment exercise. Furthermore, the risk assessment exercise was also shortened from the
version utilized by Bhaskar et al. (2016). This shortened version of the risk assessment exercise
may not have required the use of enough self-control resources such that performance declines
would be evident in those participants with limited self-control resources. It is possible the
results would differ if participants were provided the full risk assessment exercise. Lastly, the use
of students as participants was deemed appropriate due to the cognitive phenomenon being
investigated. However, it is unknown whether auditors would respond in the same manner as
auditing students.
Although the findings of this study are counter to the strength model of self-control,
future research should investigate the circumstances under which individuals’ performance is
improved or hindered by depleting self-control resources. Researchers should consider
alternative theories regarding self-control to gain a more complete perspective on how selfcontrol impacts performance in an audit context. Future research should also investigate the
persistence of depletion and determine how long the positive or negative effects of depletion may
impact performance. Currently, very little is known about how long the benefits or consequences
of depletion may last.
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STUDY THREE: AUDITOR JUDGMENT IN A MULTIPLE
ACCOUNTABILITY SETTING: THE EFFECTS OF POWER LEVEL AND
JUSTIFICATION TIMING
I. Introduction
Accountability is a key element of the auditing profession and reflects an auditor’s
responsibility to justify their decisions to a number of important parties, including various firm
members, client contacts, regulatory bodies, and financial statement users (e.g. Gibbins and
Newton 1994; Bierstaker and Wright 2001; Rich 2004; Bagley 2010). Oftentimes auditors must
manage multiple accountability relationships concurrently and consider the preferences of
multiple parties when making decisions. This can be particularly challenging when the parties’
preferences conflict. Elements of these conflicting accountability relationships can differ, which
may impact auditors’ decision-making processes. Specifically, the parties may have different
power levels, reflected in their differing abilities to impose consequences upon the auditor for
unsatisfactory performance (Tetlock 1999). In an auditing context, justification timing may also
vary. Justification timing refers to the point at which the auditor must justify their decision
relative to when the decision was made. For example, supervisory review of audit workpapers
may occur immediately upon completion of section work or be delayed a few weeks, depending
on the audit (Lambert and Agoglia 2011). Thus, the point at which the auditor must justify their
decision as part of the review process varies. Bazerman et al. (2002) allude to the potential
impact of justification timing on auditor decision making, by stating, “People tend to be far more
responsive to immediate consequences than delayed ones...” (p. 100).
This study aims to advance our understanding of auditor decision making in a multiple
accountability setting. Specifically, it investigates how the power difference between conflicting
parties and the timing of justification influence auditor decision making in a client/superior
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accountability setting. Understanding the effect of these factors is particularly important due to
their implications for audit quality. Professional standards do not suggest auditor objectivity
should be influenced by external factors associated with the multiple accountability relationships
that auditors manage (PCAOB 2015). If characteristics inherent to certain accountability
relationships negatively impact auditor judgments, firms and other professional organizations
may want to consider factors that either mitigate or eliminate their effects.
Accountability to one’s superior and the client contact represents a common
accountability relationship that auditors must manage on a day-to-day basis.29 Furthermore, the
preferences of these two parties are likely to conflict at times. The audit review process
facilitates accountability to one’s superior, as the auditor must respond to comments received
regarding their work and address any questions from their superior. Auditors experience
accountability to the client through the day-to-day interaction and dialogue that occurs when
completing section work. Auditors often request additional audit evidence or ask questions
regarding their assigned tasks (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). As part of this process, the auditor
must justify to the client why the additional requests are necessary, or explain their conclusions
regarding the appropriateness of a particular account balance or the effectiveness of an internal
control.
Accountability theory and construal level theory (CLT) establish expectations regarding
the impact of power difference and justification timing, respectively. Accountability theory
suggests that when there is a large power differential between two conflicting parties, the
accountable party will make decisions more in line with the preferences of the more powerful

29

Superior refers to the auditor’s immediate supervisor. For a senior auditor, this is generally the manager on
the engagement.
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party (Tetlock 1999). This is due to the ability of the more powerful party to impose
consequences for unsatisfactory performance that are more severe than the consequences
imposed by the less powerful party. However, when the power differential is small (i.e. there is
little difference between power levels) and the auditor faces significant consequences from either
party, auditors will engage in more cognitively, complex information processing to reach their
decisions (Tetlock 1999). This more effortful decision-making process will result in a decision
that will differ significantly from the decision made when the auditor is accountable to parties
with a large power differential. This cognitively complex information processing allows
individuals to make decisions that they can defend when required to justify their conclusions to
parties who may not agree.
Justification timing is also expected to influence auditor decision making. Accountability
theory proposes how auditors will react in a variety of accountability settings; however, it does
not address how variances in justification timing may impact individuals’ decisions. CLT
suggests that auditors think about events in the near future differently than they think about
events in the distant future (Liberman and Trope 1998). Events in the near future are assessed
using low-level construals, meaning the auditor will consider detailed, specific aspects of an
event. Distant events, on the other hand, evoke high level construals, or broader, more general
ideas and thoughts. In a decision justification setting, auditors are expected to have an increased
focus on the potential reaction of the evaluative party (a low-level construal) when the event is
near versus distant, thus causing auditors to align their decision more closely with the
preferences of the temporally proximate party.
This study employs a 2x2 between-participants experimental design to investigate the
effects of power level difference (i.e. power differential) and justification timing. Power
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differential is manipulated as large vs. small by varying the client contact’s position as either a
staff accountant or the CFO, respectively, while keeping the superior, the audit manager, the
same in both conditions. Justification timing is manipulated at two levels by varying whether the
participant must first justify their decision to their superior or to the client.
Overall, the results of this study indicate that the level of power differential between
conflicting accountability sources influences auditors’ decisions. A large power differential
between parties results in decisions that align more closely with the superior’s preference than
does a small power differential. Furthermore, accountability to conflicting sources with a small
power differential results in a more integratively complex decision-making process. Justification
timing also affected auditors’ decisions, but not in a manner consistent with CLT. The pattern of
means indicates that auditors’ decisions more closely align with the preferences of the last party
to whom they justify their decision, rather than the first.
This study contributes to the literature on accountability by furthering our understanding
of how two characteristics (power level and justification timing) inherent in conflicting
accountability relationships influence decision making. While the literature has frequently
acknowledged that multiple accountability pressures are a reality in the audit profession, limited
research has examined auditors’ decisions when accountable to multiple sources with differing
preferences (Gramling 1999; Bierstaker and Wright 2001). This study is the first to consider how
a perceived power difference between parties impacts decision making in a multiple
accountability setting.
Theoretically, this research has broader implications and helps us understand how the
power difference and justification timing between two conflicting parties influences decision
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making in a professional context. These findings may generalize to a variety of accountability
relationships in the auditing environment.
Practically, this research helps to inform audit firms, professional organizations, and
regulatory bodies how two important elements of any multiple accountability relationship
influence auditor decision making. Due to the influence of a power differential between parties,
audit firms should consider the multiple accountability relationships that auditors manage and the
impact that these relationships have on individual auditors’ decisions making processes.
Knowledge on this topic may help firms identify factors that can mitigate the undue influence of
a power difference between parties.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the theory and hypotheses
development. Section III discusses the experimental method and design. Lastly, section IV
provides the results, and section V discusses the conclusion and opportunities for future research.

II. Theory and Hypotheses Development
Accountability
Prior research on accountability in auditing demonstrates the tendency of auditors to
make decisions in line with the party to whom they are accountable, when that party’s preference
is known (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996; Peecher 1996; Tan et. al. 1997;
Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Turner 2001). Research also recognizes that auditors manage
multiple accountability relationships, including the accountability relationships to one’s superior
and to the client (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996; Bierstaker and Wright
2001). Bagley (2010) is one of a few studies to consider the effect of multiple accountability
pressures on auditor performance. She finds that auditors accountable to multiple sources
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experience higher levels of negative affect, which results in decreased performance on low
complexity audit tasks. However, due to the manipulation of multiple accountability pressures,
she is unable to determine what element of the multiple accountability setting is influencing
auditor affect- the sources of pressure, the extent or pressure, or the level of clarity regarding
source preferences. She suggests that researchers explore combinations of accountability
pressure other than the manager, partner, and PCAOB pressure combination employed in her
study.
More closely related to the current study is research that investigates how auditors are
influenced by, and respond to, conflicting viewpoints from the client and audit partner (Gramling
1999; Bierstaker and Wright 2001). Gramling (1999) and Bierstaker and Wright (2001) both
evaluate auditor decision making in an audit planning context when facing conflicting
preferences from the client and the audit partner. Gramling (1999) investigates how auditors are
impacted by client pressure (preference to reduce fees vs. receive a high-quality audit), and
partner pressure (preference for increased quality and skepticism vs. efficiency and profitability).
She finds that audit managers increase reliance on the use of internal audit when the audit client
prefers low audit fees to a high-quality audit. Interestingly, the partner’s preference for either
quality and skepticism or efficiency and profitability do not have a significant impact on the
managers’ reliance decisions. She also finds no interactive effect between client and partner
preference. Bierstaker and Wright (2001) also investigate how client fee pressure (fees are
consistent with or less than prior year) and the partner’s preference for efficiency (present or
absent) impact audit planning decisions regarding budgeted hours and planned testing. They find
that auditors budget significantly fewer hours when audit fees have decreased from prior year.
Evidence suggests that auditors generally reduce the hours of second year staff auditors. They
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do not find that the partner’s preference for efficiency impacts budgeting decisions. Related to
testing decisions, however, both client fee pressure and partner pressure do have a significant
effect on the number of planned audit tests.
While these studies investigate auditor decision-making in the presence of conflicting
preferences between accountability sources, they do not consider the impact that a power
difference between the conflicting parties has on auditor decision making. Bierstaker and Wright
(2001) and Gramling (1999) manipulate client pressure and partner pressure, but they do not
specifically manipulate a power level difference between these parties. Rather, they focus on
altering the client and partner preferences. Furthermore, these studies do not induce
accountability pressure from each source by requiring participants to justify their decision to
each party. As such, justification timing has also not been evaluated in these studies. It is
important that research consider how specific characteristics associated with conflicting parties
and certain environmental factors influence auditor decision making in a multiple accountability
setting when conflicting preferences are present.
The power of an accountability source directly relates to the level of control that the party
has over resources that the accountable party desires (Tetlock 1999). This control over desired
resources gives parties’ the ability to impose consequences for unsatisfactory performance by the
accountable party. An important element of accountability is the notion that consequences are
incurred, positive or negative, depending on whether one’s justification is satisfactory or not
(Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Lerner and Tetlock (1999) recognize multiple sub-manipulations of
accountability, one of which relates to the expectation that one’s performance will be evaluated
and consequences will be associated with unsatisfactory performance.
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In an auditing environment, when accountable to the client contact and superior, the
resources that they may control include tangible items such as monetary incentives, or audit
evidence, and intangible items such as future job opportunities, promotions, or an
accommodating work environment. As such, power level can vary among conflicting parties and
may influence an accountable party’s decision-making process. Although theoretically power
level is either equal or unequal, from a practical perspective the size of the power differential
between conflicting parties is subjective.
The level of the client contact with whom an auditor interacts may vary greatly. This
variance would then result in differing power levels between the client and superior. Smaller
audit clients often have fewer accounting personnel, so there is less diffusion of accounting
responsibilities. Management may be performing a variety of accounting functions; thus,
auditors at all levels may interact directly with client management. Conversely, larger audit
clients have a number of accounting personnel. Individual workers may be assigned
responsibilities that focus on one area of the business rather than covering multiple diverse areas.
In this situation, audit team members may interact with a lower level accountant specifically
responsible for the area under audit.
In the current study, the power differential between accountability sources is
operationalized by describing the client as either the CFO or a staff accountant. The superior in
this study is the audit manager. The audit manager and a CFO are expected to have a small
power differential, as both are capable of enforcing more severe consequences with a longerterm effect. In addition to creating a headache for the auditor on a day-to-day basis by being
unhelpful and slow to respond to audit requests, the CFO’s position within the organization
allows him or her to request the auditors’ removal from the engagement or prevent the auditor
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from obtaining future employment with the company. Similarly, the auditor’s superior may also
request the auditor’s removal from the audit engagement or give a poor performance review.
Conversely, when the client contact is a lower level accountant, the manner in which he or she
can react to unsatisfactory responses from the auditor is limited. He or she may create
challenges for the auditor by being unhelpful and slow to respond to the auditor’s requests, but
likely cannot impose consequences as severe or long lasting as the auditor’s superior. This
situation, therefore, represents a large power differential between the client and superior.
Accountability theory suggests that when one party is more powerful than the other,
individuals tend to align their decisions with the more powerful party (Tetlock 1999). However,
when the power difference between parties is small, the decision is less clear-cut as auditors will
likely feel conflicted about which party to please. In an attempt to manage reactions from both
powerful parties, auditors may engage in a more cognitively complex decision-making process.
In this situation, individuals’ responses will likely differ from the responses formulated when
auditors are accountable to parties with a large power differential.
The auditing environment is unique, as significant judgment is involved in determining
the proper accounting treatment for a particular situation, often with a range of possible
outcomes. As such, when there is a large power differential between parties, precise decision
alignment is unlikely. However, the more powerful party is expected to have greater influence on
the auditors’ decisions. Thus, the auditors’ decisions will align more closely with the more
powerful party’s preference. In the client/superior setting where the superior is the more
powerful party, auditors’ decisions will align more closely with their superior’s preference
compared to when the auditor is accountable to a client and superior with a small power
differential.
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H1a: Auditors will make decisions more in line with their superior when the power
differential between the client contact and superior is large, compared to when the
power differential is small.
Accountability theory also suggests that auditors accountable to conflicting parties will
exert more cognitive effort in their decision-making process (Tetlock 1999; Green et al. 2000).
They “…may become more integratively complex in their consideration of the issues at hand,
recognizing alternative perspectives on an issue….and identifying trade-offs” (Green et al. 2000,
1381). This allows the decision maker to reach a defensible conclusion when called upon by
either party to justify their decision. Prior research supports this notion and finds that auditors
engage in more effortful decision making when accountable to multiple sources with conflicting
viewpoints (Jensen 1999; Wood 2009). Further, as auditors face increased pressure as a result of
conflicting views from parties with a small power differential, the cognitive effort exerted is
expected to be greater than if the power differential is large. When the power differential is
small, the auditor is expected to exert more effort to formulate a unique response. When the
power differential is large, the auditor is expected to be influenced by the more powerful party
and is expected to exert less cognitive effort.
H1b: Auditors will engage in more integrative, complex thinking when the power
differential between the client contact and superior is small, compared to when
the power differential is large.
Construal Level Theory
Construal level theory is a comprehensive decision-making theory in social psychology,
which helps provide a better understanding of individual behavior given various levels of
psychological distance (temporal, spatial, social, or hypotheticality) (Trope and Liberman 2003).
Trope and Liberman (2010) describe psychological distance as “…a subjective experience that
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something is close or far away from the self, here, and now” (p. 440). Experimental researchers
in accounting have begun to apply CLT to predict behavioral outcomes in a variety of areas
including managerial accounting (McPhee 2014), financial accounting (e.g. Elliott et al. 2014),
and auditing (e.g. Backof et al. 2016). Specific to the audit context, Backof et al. (2016)
investigate whether auditor mindset and evidence format influence auditor skepticism regarding
managements’ assumptions underlying a complex estimate. Drawing on CLT, they propose and
find that priming a concrete mindset improves auditors’ skepticism by increasing auditors’
awareness towards evidence that is inconsistent with management’s assumption. The concrete
mindset prime also has an additive effect on skepticism levels when utilized in conjunction with
graphical (as opposed to textual) evidence which also increases auditor skepticism. Furthermore,
Weisner and Sutton (2015) apply the spatial component of psychological distance and find that
increased spatial distance in the location of a teleworking specialist results in reduced auditor
reliance on the specialist. Weisner’s (2015) review of CLT research provides additional
opportunities for the application of CLT in accounting.
From an auditing perspective, one type of psychological distance that could impact
judgments is the temporal component. This is particularly important to consider given that the
point at which one must justify his or her decisions may vary by accountability source. For
example, the audit review process may be delayed (Lambert and Agoglia 2011), thus
justification to one’s superior may occur weeks after the completion of section work, while
justification to the client is required during the execution of the required audit tasks. While not
directly related to the experimental context in this study, Peecher and Solomon (2014)
acknowledge that PCAOB inspections occur subsequent to the completion of fieldwork and in a
different study Peecher et al. (2013) propose research questions that consider differences in
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concurrent and retrospective inspections. Auditors may have to justify their decisions to
regulators months after the completion of the audit work. CLT provides an explanation of how
auditors might respond to conflicting accountabilities with varying justification timing.
CLT suggests that variance in temporal distance affects the way in which individuals
evaluate or think about certain events. When assessing events in the near future and distant
future, individuals use low-level and high level construals, respectively. High level construals
consist of broader, more general thoughts about the event and include features that are essential
to its occurrence, while low level construals consist of more contextual features or aspects of the
event that are situation specific (Trope and Liberman 2003).
Given that individuals assess temporally proximate events using low-level construals, one
can infer auditors’ actions in situations where justification of a decision is more immediate. In
thinking about the requirement to justify their decision to certain evaluative others, auditors will
consider specific, contextual details associated with the justification process when required to
justify their decisions in the near future. They may imagine the person to whom they will justify
their decision, and how and when the justification process will take place. They will likely
consider the immediate reaction they will receive for providing an undesirable explanation and
consider how both they and the evaluative party will feel. For temporally distant events,
however, the auditor will think about the event in broader terms. They may only consider that
justification will require them to explain their decisions, but fail to consider specific, contextual
details of the situation.
Differences in justification timing are expected to alter decision outcomes. When
justification timing differs between two conflicting parties, the auditor is expected to focus on
the preferences of the party to whom they must justify their decision in the near future over the
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preferences of the party to whom they must justify their decision in the distant future. This is due
to the more focused and detailed consideration given to the temporally proximate event.
H2:

When justification timing varies, auditors will make decisions more in line with
the party to whom they must first justify their response.

When auditors must first justify their decision to their superior, the consequences
perceived by auditors in both the large and small power differential conditions would be similar.
Thus, in this situation, auditors in each power differential condition will make judgments that
align more closely with their superior’s preferences. This is due to the auditor’s focus on the
potential consequences for providing an unsatisfactory response to this more temporally
proximate party. However, when they must first justify their decision to the client, the power
differential between parties has an effect. When the power difference between the client (staff
accountant) and superior is large, auditors are expected to perceive the consequences associated
with an unfavorable response to be less severe than auditors who are accountable to the client
(CFO) and superior with a small power difference. Given this difference in perceived
consequences, auditors are expected to most closely align their decisions with the client
preferences when they must first justify their decision to the client and there is a small power
differential between the client and the superior.
H3:

Justification timing will moderate the effect of power level such that auditors will
make decisions more in line with the client when there is a low power differential
between the client contact and the superior, and the auditor must justify their
decision to the client first.
III. Experimental Method and Design
Participants

Auditor participants were obtained through Qualtrics Panel, which used a “double opt-in
process” when recruiting panel members to help guarantee high-quality participants. Panel
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members were screened prior to participation to ensure they had the appropriate credentials.
Only those recruits who were currently employed as an external auditor and worked at a firm
with greater than 1,000 people were qualified to participate. Useable responses were obtained
from 80 auditors. 30 Table 6 presents demographic information for the participants.
Approximately 81% of participants had 1-10 years of auditing experience. The majority of
participants had only external audit experience (72.5%), but some had experience in both
external and internal audit (27.5%). Participants were also primarily current staff and senior
auditors (68.8%). Fifty-five percent of all participants were female and 45% were male.
Table 6: Demographic Profile of Participants
n (%)
Gender:
Female
Male

44 (55.0)
36 (45.0)

Age:
18-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
40+

1 (1.2)
8 (10.0)
22 (27.5)
18 (22.5)
12 (15.0)
19 (23.8)

Years of Auditing Experience:
1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16+ years

34 (42.5)
31 (38.8)
9 (11.2)
6 (7.5)

Type of Auditing Experience:
External Audit
Internal Audit and External

58 (72.5)
22 (27.5)

30

Upon collection,
Audit qualitative data associated with the DV was evaluated to ensure quality responses and sufficient
effort. Those responses were reviewed for the following characteristics- gibberish, uninterpretable incomplete
sentences, responses that do not relate to the question or materials provided, and responses that indicate a lack of
interest in the study. Data with these characteristics were excluded due to poor quality and additional data were
obtained by Qualtrics Panel. Three rounds of data collection were executed to obtain 105 responses, 80 of which
were deemed usable. In the overall sample of 105 participants, 25 participants were excluded for the following
reasons: 13 were removed due to an improper response to an open-ended question regarding the DV, 10 were
removed due to an unreasonable number of auditors being on an average.
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n (%)
Level within the Firm
Staff
Senior
Manager/Sr. Manager
Partner

18 (22.5)
37 (46.3)
20 (25)
5 (6.3)

Experimental Task
This experiment is a 2 x 2 between-participants experimental design that manipulates
power differential (small vs. large) between parties with conflicting viewpoints and justification
timing (superior first vs. client first). The participants are told that that their client contact is
either the staff accountant or the CFO, which represents the manipulation of the large and small
power differential, respectively. They are then told they must immediately explain their decision
to either their superior or the client contact. They are also told that they will be asked to explain
their decision to the remaining party at a later point in time.
Participants receive a hypothetical case about the calculation for the allowance for
uncollectible accounts.31 They assume the role of the audit senior on the engagement for CWN
where they are responsible for the audit of the allowance for doubtful accounts. Due to a change
in marketing strategy at CWN, the client has elected to change the reserve percentages associated
with this account. The new marketing strategy has resulted in the addition of four major
customers to CWN’s customer base. After the change in marketing strategy, multiple smaller
customers from prior years make up a significantly smaller portion of CWN’s accounts
receivable than they have in the past. As a result, the client has changed the way that the reserve
percentages are calculated. They have opted to use only current year information to calculate the

31

Task was adapted from Johnstone and Muztako (2002).
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uncollectibilty of each aging bucket resulting in an allowance account balance of $400,000. In
prior years, however, they have used a five-year historical average for this calculation.
Participants are told that their superior, the audit manager on the engagement, prefers a
more conservative approach and favors the methodology used in the prior year. The
methodology used in prior years would yield a balance of $600,000 in the allowance account.
The new methodology results in a balance that is $200,000 less than it would be if the balance
were calculated using the methodology the client has employed in prior years. This scenario is
designed to elicit feelings of conflict between the client and the superior. Information concerning
the four new customers and their credit histories, as well as the client’s reserve calculation and
the prior year audit workpaper are made available to participants. They are then asked to make a
decision regarding the appropriate balance for the allowance for doubtful accounts and to
provide a justification for that decision.

Independent Variables
Power differential between the superior and client contact is manipulated by altering the
client’s position within their organization. As discussed previously, the ability to control
resources that a decision maker values represents an individual’s power level. The control of
these resources allows an individual to impose consequences upon a decision maker for
unsatisfactory performance. While imposing actual consequences upon participants is not
possible, the participants are told what consequences they may incur for disagreeing with their
client or superior. The wording utilized in the case materials to describe the consequences
associated with unsatisfactory responses to the various parties is provided in Appendix A.
A large power differential is operationalized by describing the client contact as a staff
accountant and the superior as an audit manager. The scenario describes potential consequences
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for not agreeing with each of the respective parties. The staff accountant is unlikely to be able to
impose consequences as severe as the auditor’s superior, thus representing a large power
differential between the two parties. The accountant may create challenges for the auditor by
being unhelpful and slow to respond to the auditors’ requests. However, they likely cannot
impose consequences as severe or long lasting as the auditor’s superior, such as providing a poor
performance review or requesting the auditor’s removal from the audit engagement.
A small power differential, on the other hand, is operationalized by describing the client
contact as the CFO; the superior is the audit manager in this condition as well. The CFO also has
the ability to potentially impose severe consequences with a longer-term effect, similar to those
of the audit superior. The CFO’s position within their organization will likely allow him or her
to request the auditors’ removal from the engagement and prevent the auditor from being
considered for future job opportunities with the company. The ability to impose more severe,
potentially long-term consequences represents the small power difference between the audit
superior and the CFO.
Justification timing is manipulated as superior first or client first. Participants are told
they must immediately provide an explanation to the audit manager [staff accountant/CFO] for
their decision regarding the appropriate balance for the allowance for doubtful accounts. They
are then told that they will also be asked to provide an explanation for their decision to the staff
accountant/CFO [audit manager] at a later point in time. Although participants did not
experience an actual, significant time delay, prior psychology research on construal level theory
has successfully manipulated temporal distance by describing a time delay (Liberman and Trope
1998; Trope and Liberman 2000). As such, the manipulation utilized in this study is expected to
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successfully manipulate temporal distance such that participants consider the immediate event
using low level construals and the distant event using high level construals.
To operationalize accountability in the experimental setting, participants were told that
their work will be reviewed and they will be asked to immediately provide an explanation for
their decision to one of the two parties to whom they are accountable. This party varies
depending on experimental condition. They were also told they will be required to provide an
explanation to the remaining party at a later point in time. Participants were required to “sign
off” on the balance they deem to be appropriate, which consisted of them agreeing to a statement
acknowledging that they feel the balance they selected is appropriate and that they are signing
off on their work.

Attention and Manipulation Check Questions
Prior to the dependent variable, participants were asked what role they were to assume in
the case provided. They were not allowed to continue with the survey until they provided the
correct response. This was done to ensure participants assumed the proper role when responding
to the dependent variable. This question is an attention check and is not deemed to be a
manipulation check as participants across all conditions assumed the role of audit senior.
Immediately following the screen with the dependent variable, the first manipulation
check question asked participants to indicate the position of their client contact in the case
materials provided. Those participants who responded incorrectly to this question were not
allowed to continue with the survey, as it suggests insufficient attention was paid to the case
materials.
To determine if the participants perceived a power difference between the client contact
and the superior, they were asked two questions related to perceived consequences. The first
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question asked about the severity of consequences associated with making a decision that does
not align with the client contact and the second asked about the severity of consequences
associated with making a decision that does not align with the audit manager. Theoretically,
power difference represents the variability in consequences that may occur between two
accountability sources. In the small power differential condition, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
indicates there was no significant difference in the perceived consequences for disagreeing with
the CFO (mean = 3.23) and the audit manager (mean = 3.23) (p = 0.39, one-tailed). However,
participants in the large power differential condition did perceive the consequences for
disagreeing with the audit manager (mean = 3.25) to be significantly more severe than the
consequences for disagreeing with the staff accountant (mean = 2.88) (p = 0.02, one-tailed).
These results indicate that the variation in the client contact’s position successfully manipulated
the perceived power level difference between the accountability sources, such that there was a
large and small power difference in the staff accountant and CFO conditions, respectively.

Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable is the extent to which the participant’s response aligns
with the superior’s preference. The measure used to assess decision alignment (H1a, H2 and H3)
is the dollar difference between the client’s preferred balance in the allowance for doubtful
accounts and the participant’s judgment regarding the appropriate balance. The client prefers a
balance of $400,000, and the superior prefers a balance of $600,000; thus, the amount can range
from $0 to $200,000. The larger the difference, the greater the alignment between the
participant’s assessment and the superior’s preference.
The extent of integratively complex thinking employed by each participant (H1b) is
measured based on the total number of factors that the participant considered in making their
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decision. These factors consist of items related to the decision itself as well as to the external
decision making environment. More factors identified by the auditors suggest a greater
consideration of “alternative perspectives on an issue” as well as trade-offs between various
decision outcomes (Green et al. 2000, 1381). Those participants employing more integrative
complex thinking should identify more factors as applicable to their decision-making process.

IV. Results
Decision Alignment
Table 7, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for decision alignment for each
experimental condition. The higher the value, the greater the alignment of the participant’s
decision and the superior’s preference. The values displayed are in thousands of dollars. A
review of the means associated with each power differential condition shows that auditors
accountable to the staff accountant made decisions that were $13,500 closer to their superior’s
preference (mean = 114.35) than did auditors accountable to the CFO (mean = 100.05). The
mean difference between the small power difference and large power difference indicates that
auditors tend to more closely align their decisions with the preferences of their superior when
there is a large power differential between the client and their superior. Justification timing also
appears to impact auditors’ decisions. However, a comparison of group means suggests that
auditors align their decisions more closely to the preferences of their superior when they must
justify their decision to the client first (mean = 118.56) compared to when they must justify their
decision to their superior first (mean = 95.26). A graphical depiction of the results is provided in
Figure 5.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of H1a, H2, and H3.
Decision Alignment (in 000’s) *
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Decision Alignment (higher value equals greater
alignment with superior) Mean [Standard Deviation]
Justification Timing
Power Differential

Client First

Superior First

114.45
[50.28]
n=20

85.65
[38.63]
n=20

100.05
[46.60]
n=40

122.48
[50.45]
n=21

105.37
[36.90]
n=19

114.35
[44.81]
n=40

118.56
[49.90]
n=41

95.26
[38.61]
n=39

Small Power DifferentialCFO Client Contact

Large Power DifferentialStaff Accountant Client
Contact

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of Variation

df

MSE

F-statistic

p-value

Power Difference
Justification Timing
Power Diff X Justification Timing
Prior AR Audit Experience
Error

1
1
1
1
75

5709.42
9665.42
592.95
6410.04

2.945
4.986
.306
3.307

0.090
0.029
0.582
0.073

T-statistic

p-value b

-1.745

0.043

2.274
-.592

0.985
0.278

Panel C: Planned Comparison Tests a
H1a: Small Power Differential<Large Power
Differential (+1,+1,-1,-1)
H2: Client First < Superior First (+1,+1,-1,-1)
H3: Small Power Differential/Client First < Small
Power Differential/Superior First, Large Power
Differential/Client First, Large Power
Differential/Superior First (-3,+1,+1,+1)
a
b

Includes covariate of prior AR experience
Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent

* Decision alignment is the dollar difference between the client’s preferred balance in the allowance for doubtful accounts and
the participant’s judgment regarding the appropriate balance. The amount can range from $0 to $200,000. The larger the
difference, the greater the alignment between the participant’s assessment and the superior’s preference.
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Figure 5: Graphical Depiction of Results- Decision Alignment
H1a predicts that an auditor’s decision will align more closely with the preference of
their superior when there is a large power differential between the client and superior compared
to when there is a small power differential between the client and the superior. A 2 x 2
ANCOVA is conducted with power difference and justification timing as the independent
variables and prior experience with accounts receivable as the control variable. 32 The results are
provided in Table 7, Panel B. The results suggest there is a marginally significant main effect for
power difference (F = 2.945, p = 0.090, two-tailed). Due to the directional nature of the
hypothesis, a planned comparison of the means between the large power differential condition
and small power differential condition was conducted. The small power differential condition is

32

Participants were asked to respond to demographic questions regarding age, gender, and work experience.
Questions about work experience include information regarding years of prior work experience in accounting and
auditing, type of prior work experience, prior experience auditing accounts receivable, firm type, current level
within their firm, and primary industry. All demographic variables were regressed on the primary dependent variable
of decision alignment and evaluated for significance. Of those variables, only two, gender and prior experience with
accounts receivable, were significant at p < .10 However, when including these variables in the ANCOVA model,
gender was insignificant at p = 0.174. As such, the ANCOVA model included only prior AR experience as a
covariate. The conclusions reached based on the statistical analysis do not differ whether you include or exclude
gender as a covariate in the ANCOVA model.
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assigned a contrast weight of +1, and the large power differential is assigned a contrast weight of
-1. Table 7, Panel C shows that the planned comparison is significant (t= -1.745, p = 0.043, onetailed). Furthermore, a review of the group means also indicates the significant results are in the
expected direction. Auditors’ decisions more closely align with the preferences of the auditor’s
superior when there is large power differential between the client and superior, thus H1a is
supported.
H2 predicts that when auditors justify their decisions to two conflicting parties, the
decision will more closely align with the party to whom they must first provide their
justification. As shown in Table 7, Panel B, the results indicate a significant main effect for
justification timing (F = 4.986; p = 0.029, two-tailed). H2 is tested using a planned comparison,
with the client first condition assigned a contrast weight of +1, and the superior first condition
assigned a contrast weight of -1. The results shown in Table 7, Panel C suggest that the main
effect of justification timing is not significant in the predicted direction (t=2.274, p = 0.985, onetailed). Rather, the group means indicate that auditors align their decisions with the preference of
the party to whom they must justify their decision last rather than first. As such, H2 is not
supported.
Finally, H3 predicts an interactive effect between power level and justification timing
such that justification timing moderates the effect of power differential. More specifically,
decisions should align most closely with the client when the power differential between the client
and superior is small, and the auditor must first justify his or her decision to the client. A planned
comparison was conducted to identify whether participants in the small power differential/client
first condition made decisions that are significantly different than participants in all other
conditions. The small power differential/client first condition was assigned a contrast weight of -

116

3, while all other conditions were assigned contrast weights of +1. Table 7, Panel C presents the
results of the planned contrast and suggests no significant difference between the small power
differential/client first condition and all other conditions (t = -.592; p = 0.278, one-tailed). As
such, H3 is not supported.

Integrative Complexity
H1b evaluates the extent of integratively complex thinking employed in the auditor’s
decision-making process. It predicts that auditors accountable to conflicting parties with a small
power differential will engage in a more integrative complexity decision-making process than
those accountable to conflicting parties with a large power differential. The dependent variable
of interest is the number of factors each participant identified as being part of their decisionmaking process. Table 8 provides a description of each factor and the number of participants
who identified that factor as being important in their decision-making process. The
reasonableness of the client’s new method for calculating the allowance was the most frequently
selected factor.
Table 8: Number of Factors Identified by Factor Type
Reasonablenes
s of Client’s
New Method

Ability to
Explain
the
Decision
to Others

Manager’s
Happiness
with the
Decision

Client’s
Happiness
with the
Decision

Background
and
Experience
of the Client

Customer
Credit
Histories

Background
and
Experience
of the
Manager

Client
Contact’s
Rank
within the
Company

53

51

42

40

40

39

26

15

*Each participant could select 1-9 factors that they considered in their allowance decision. The ninth category
was “other” and allowed for text entry to capture any additional items that the participants may have considered
in their decision-making processes. No participants selected this category, thus it has been excluded from the
table.

Table 9, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for this measure. A review of the
means suggests that participants in the small power differential condition identified more factors
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as being related to their allowance decision (mean = 4.20) than participants in the large power
differential condition (mean = 3.45). Figure 6 provides a graphical depiction of the results related
to integrative complexity.
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of H1b
Extent of Integrative Complexity
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Extent of Integrative Complexity (Number of Factors
Identified) Mean [Standard Deviation]
Justification Timing
Power Differential
Small Power DifferentialCFO Client Contact

Large Power DifferentialStaff Accountant Client
Contact

Client First

Manager First

3.95
[2.417]
n=20

4.45
[2.089]
n=20

4.20
[2.244]
n=40

3.67
[1.826]
n=21

3.21
[1.653]
n=19

3.45
[1.739]
n=40

3.80
[2.112]
n=41

3.85
[1.967]
n=39

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Source of Variation

df

MSE

F-statistic

p-value

Power Difference
Justification Timing
Power Diff X Justification Timing
Error

1
1
1
76

11.580
.010
4.565

2.842
.002
1.120

0.096
0.961
0.293

Panel C: Planned Comparison Test
H1b: Small Power Differential > Large Power
Differential (+1,+1,-1,-1)
a

Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent
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T-statistic

p-value a

1.686

0.048

Figure 6: Graphical Depiction of Results- Integrative Complexity
To test H1b, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with the number of factors the participant
identified as being part of their decision-making process representing the dependent variable, and
power differential and justification timing as the independent variables.33 Table 9, Panel B
presents the main effect for power differential (F= 2.842, p = 0.096, two-tailed). The planned
comparison evaluating whether participants in the small power differential condition identified
more factors as being relevant to their decision than participants in the large power differential
condition is presented in Table 9, Panel C. The results of the planned comparison suggest that
participants in the small power differential condition identified significantly more factors than
those in the large power differential condition (t=1.686, p = 0.048, one-tailed34), thus, H1b is
supported for this measure.

33

Participants were asked to respond to demographic questions regarding age, gender, and work experience.
Questions about work experience include information regarding years of prior work experience in accounting and
auditing, type of prior work experience, prior experience auditing accounts receivable, firm type, current level
within their firm, and primary industry. All demographic variables were regressed on the dependent variables (total
factors identified) and evaluated for significance. Of those variables, none were significant at p < .10, thus no
covariates were included in the analysis.
34
The Levene’s test is not significant, thus the assumption of homogeneity of variance is satisfied.
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IV. Conclusion
This results from this study provide evidence that the power level difference between two
conflicting parties does influence auditors’ decisions. Consistent with accountability theory,
when there is a large power differential between two conflicting parties, auditors’ decisions align
more closely with the preferences of the more powerful party. The results also suggest that the
difference in these decisions is due to the auditors employing a more integratively complex
decision-making process when accountable to conflicting parties with a small power difference.
However, justification timing also appears to influence auditor decision making, but not in a
manner consistent with the predictions of CLT. Participants align their decisions with the
preferences of the temporally distant party, rather than the temporally proximate party.
The unexpected findings regarding justification timing may be attributable to a couple of
factors centered around the possibility that the participants employed a negotiation mindset when
making their decision. They may have made a decision that aligns more with the party to whom
they must justify their decision last, thus providing some flexibility to compromise and
somewhat accommodate the first party’s preference when meeting with them. Thereby, pleasing
the first party through compromise, yet still aligning their decision, to a greater degree, with the
party to whom they must last justify their decision, ultimately pleasing both parties to some
extent. Participants may have also perceived a greater social connection with the audit manager.
As such, they side with their manager when they must justify their decision to the manager last.
In this instance, they may feel there is less opportunity to change their decision because they
have already talked with the client, and ultimately, they want to please their manager due the
strong social connection. However, when they justify their decision to the manager first, they
side with the client as they may perceive that the manager would want to accommodate the
client’s position to some extent. Furthermore, they may feel they that if the manager is adamant
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against taking the client’s position, they can adjust their position if necessary. They would then
contact the client with their decision, knowing they have the support of their manager. Although
the experimental design did not provide opportunity for negotiation and an ability to alter the
decision made throughout the justification process, the participants may have approached the
task with their knowledge of the audit environment where this would likely be possible.
The findings of this study contribute to auditing research on accountability by identifying
another way in which auditors’ decisions are influenced by accountability pressure. Historically,
research in this area has focused on accountability to a single source. This study is one of the
first to investigate how certain characteristics within a multiple accountability setting influence
auditor decision making. This is particularly important give the multiple accountability pressures
that auditors face in practice. Understanding the impact of a power differential between
conflicting accountability sources allows audit firms to implement mechanism that may be able
to mitigate these effects.
As with any study, there are limitations that must be recognized. The use of practicing
auditors allowed the participants to better internalize the case materials and provided an
understanding of the audit environment that audit students likely would not have. However, the
electronic distribution of this experiment to auditors in remote locations provides less control
than if the study were conducted in a laboratory setting. Due to this electronic distribution, the
temporal manipulation was simulated by using specific wording in the case provided. It is
possible, however, that a laboratory setting could produce results consistent with CLT when a
significant timing delay between justifications to multiple accountability sources can be
implemented. Furthermore, audit participants may have applied their understanding of the
environment to the audit experiment, thus making assumptions that extend beyond the
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experimental manipulations and thereby influencing their decisions in a manner inconsistent with
theory.
The presence of multiple accountability pressures alone does not influence auditor
decision making in a standard, predictable manner. Furthermore, the need to concurrently
manage multiple accountability pressures is somewhat unique to the audit environment and
differentiates the audit setting from a number of other work environments. Future research
should investigate additional environmental factors or accountability source characteristics that
influence decision making in a multiple accountability setting. Research should also consider
contexts outside of the client/superior relationship and investigate auditor decision making when
accountable to multiple other parties from regulators to the audit committee and various other
stakeholders. Related to this study, researchers may also want to explore why the predictions
associated with CLT do not apply in the audit setting. This could provide a better understanding
of those factors that influence auditor decision making and provide more insight into those
situations where CLT may not be applicable.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
This dissertation contains three studies examining accountability in auditing. Phillip
Tetlock’s social contingency model serves as the common underlying theory utilized in each
study (Tetlock 1992, Tetlock and Lerner 1999, Tetlock 1999). This social psychological theory
focuses on conceptualizing individuals’ responses to accountability pressure. The first study
develops an organizing framework for the experimental auditing literature on accountability and
provides a discussion of the research based on this framework. It also synthesizes this literature
and compares the overall findings to the social contingency model, offering a discussion of
where these findings are consistent with the social contingency model and those instances where
the findings deviate from theory. Studies two and three, which utilize Tetlock’s social
contingency model as theoretical motivation, experimentally investigate individual auditors’
decision making under accountability pressure. In addition to utilizing Tetlock’s theory, the
second study uses the strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al. 1998) to examine whether
accountability can mitigate the effect that ego depletion has on auditor performance. The third
study investigates the influence of multiple accountability pressures on auditor decision making,
also utilizing the social contingency model, as well as construal level theory (Liberman and
Trope 1998) as theoretical motivation. While these studies all have a common theme of
accountability, they contribute to our understanding of accountability in three unique ways.
Study one reviews the experimental audit literature on accountability and provides
opportunities for future research. While much of the research on accountability focuses on the
effect that accountability pressure from a single source has on auditor decision making, far less
investigates the effects of multiple accountability pressures. Furthermore, limited research
considers the way in which auditors respond to process and outcome accountability, thus
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providing another fruitful area of research. Research focuses heavily on the impact that
accountability has on auditor judgment and decision making. Surprisingly, very little research
considers how environmental factors influence perceptions of accountability. To fully understand
how accountability will influence auditors in practice, it is important to understand those factors
that influence feelings of accountability within the audit context.
Overall, the literature review also suggests that the findings of the auditing research on
accountability are generally consistent with the social contingency model. However, there are
some instances where research appears to deviate from this model. A closer look suggests that
the results are not necessarily inconsistent with the model, but rather, the studies encompass
factors not captured in the model. Specifically, knowledge of an accountability source’s
preferences does not always hinder auditor effort. When these preferences are for an effective
audit process, auditor effort and testing strategies can be improved.
Study two experimentally investigates the moderating effect of accountability. It
examines whether accountability mitigates the performance declines auditor’s experience when
suffering from ego depletion. While prior research shows depletion negatively impacts auditor
performance (Bhaskar et al. 2016), the results of this study indicate that depletion may improve
auditor performance in certain circumstances. Additionally, the findings suggest that the
performance of auditors who are accountable for their work does not differ significantly based on
the presence or absence of ego depletion.
Study three examines how multiple accountability pressures influence auditors’
decisions. It considers how a power level difference between two accountability sources, as well
as a variance in justification timing, impact auditors’ decisions. Specifically, this study
operationalizes multiple accountability pressures as conflicting preferences from the audit client
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and audit manager regarding the appropriate balance in allowance for doubtful accounts. These
findings indicate that auditors are influenced by a power level difference between conflicting
parties, and that justification timing also has an effect on auditors’ decisions.
Taken together, studies two and three further our understanding of how individual
auditors respond to accountability pressure(s). These studies also contribute to two other streams
of research outside of accountability, one looking at the effects of ego depletion on auditor
performance (study two), and the other focusing on the application of construal level theory in
auditing (study three). Study two provides evidence that accountability is successful at
improving auditor performance. However, ego depletion is also found to improve performance,
but the effect of depletion and accountability is not additive. As such, accountability can be seen
as a substitute for depletion as a means of improving auditor performance. Study three highlights
the importance of considering the way in which certain characteristics associated with multiple
accountability relationships influence decision making. Investigating the impact of multiple
accountability pressures requires the manipulation of accountability source attributes or
environmental characteristics to fully understand the extent to which auditors are influenced by
multiple parties.
The results of this dissertation should be of interest to accounting firms due to the
practical implications of the findings. Prior research on accountability in auditing suggests that
firms should focus on communicating preferences for conducting the audit in an effective
manner, with an emphasis on skepticism and objectivity. This will help to increase audit effort
and result in a less biased decision making process. Firms should also be interested in the
performance gains that depleted auditors may experience in certain circumstances, likely by
priming auditors’ system one to engage in more effortful cognitive processing. Accountability
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also improves auditor performance to a similar degree in instances where auditors are not
depleted. Lastly, firms should consider identifying mechanisms that may mitigate the
unwelcomed effects that a power differential and justification timing have on auditor decision
making, or consider restructuring certain elements of the accountability relationships in a manner
that limits these effects. Overall, this dissertation offers useful information to firms and
regulators, which can help them to maximize auditor objectivity in the decision-making process
when accountability pressure is present, thereby improving overall audit quality.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF CONSEQUENCES
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Potential consequences for disagreeing with the audit manager’s preference:
“You recognize that taking a position counter to your Manager’s preference may
(also) result in consequences, such as a request for your removal from the
engagement team or unfavorable scheduling on other client engagements.”

Potential consequences for disagreeing with the CFO’s preference:
“You recognize that taking a position counter to the CFO’s preference may (also)
result in consequences, such as a request for your removal form the engagement
team or lost job opportunities at CWN in the future.”

Potential consequences for disagreeing with the staff accountant’s preference:
“You recognize that taking a position counter to the staff accountant’s preference
may (also) result in consequences, such as delayed responses to audit requests and
an unfriendly demeanor towards the audit team.”
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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Study 2- Experimental Materials- Initial Experiment
All- Consent

134

All- Agreement to Participate

135

Depleted Group– E-Counting Task Part 1

136

Depleted Group– E-Counting Task Part 2

137

Non- Accountable- Task Instructions

138

Non-Accountable- Task Instructions

139

Non-Accountable- Task Instructions

140

Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

141

Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

142

Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

143

Accountable- Task Instructions

144

Accountable- Task Instructions

145

Accountable- Task Instructions

146

Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

147

Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

148

Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

149

All- Overall Risk Assessment

150

All- Instructions to Proceed

151

All- Stroop Task Instructions

After this screen, participants were redirected to another website to complete the Stroop
Task. Upon completion of the Stroop Task, they completed the manipulation check
questions, post experimental questions, and demographic questions shown on the next
several pages.

152

All- Manipulation Check Questions

153

All- BMIS Mood Scale (Mayer and Gaschke 1988)

154

All- Trait Self Control (Tangney et al. 2004)

155

All- Perception of Depletion (Clarkson et al. 2010)

156

All- Trait Skepticism (Hurtt 2010)

157

158

All- Post Experimental Question

159

All- Demographic Questions

160

161

All- End of Survey Screen

162

Study 2- Experimental Materials- Follow Up Experiment
All- Consent

163

All- Agreement to Participate

164

Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 1

165

Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 2

166

Non-Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 1

167

Non-Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 2

168

Non-Accountable- Task Instructions

169

Non-Accountable- Task Instructions

170

Non-Accountable- Task Instructions

171

Non-Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

172

Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

173

Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

174

Accountable- Task Instructions

175

Accountable- Task Instructions

176

Accountable- Task Instructions

177

Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

178

Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

179

Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)

180

All- Overall Risk Assessment

181

All- End of Risk Assessment Exercise

182

All- State Mood (PANAS Scale- Watson et al. 1988)

183

All- Manipulation Check Question

184

All- Perception of Depletion (Clarkson et al. 2010) and level of motivation

185

All- Trait Self Control (Tangney et al. 2004)

186

All- Trait Skepticism (Hurtt 2010)

187

188

All Demographic Questions

189

190

All- Trait Mood (PANAS Scale- Watson et al. 1988)

191

All- End of Survey Screen

192

Study 3- Experimental Materials
All- Screening Questions

193

All- Consent

194

CFO Client Contact
Version A- CFO/Client First
Version B- CFO/Superior First

195

CFO – Background Reading (Versions A&B)

196

CFO/Client First- Task Description (Version A)

197

CFO/Client First- Dependent Variable (Version A)

198

199

CFO/Superior First- Task Description (Version B)

200

CFO/Superior First- Dependent Variable (Version B)

201

202

All- Manipulation Check

203

CFO – Post Experimental Questions Part 1 (Versions A & B)

204

CFO- Post Experimental Questions Part 2 (Versions A&B)

205

All- Skepticism Scale

206

207

CFO/Client First- Second Explanation (Versions A)

208

CFO/Superior First- Second Explanation (Version B)

209

Staff Accountant Client Contact
Version C- Staff Accountant/Client First
Version D- Staff Accountant/Superior First

210

Staff Accountant- Background Reading (Versions C&D)

211

Staff Accountant/Client First- Task Description (Version C)

212

Staff Accountant/Client First- Dependent Variable (Version C)

213

214

Staff Accountant/Superior First – Task Description (Version D)

215

Staff Accountant/Superior First – Dependent Variable (Version D)

216

217

All- Manipulation Check

218

Staff Accountant- Post Experimental Questions part 1 (Versions C&D)

219

Staff Accountant- Post Experimental Questions Part 2 (Versions C&D)

220

All- Skepticism Scale

221

222

Staff Accountant/Client First- Second Explanation (Versions C)

223

Staff Accountant/Superior First- Second Explanation (Version D)

224

All – Demographic Questions

225

226

227

Audit Evidence
Links were provided on the dependent variable screen

228

Client’s Allowance Calculation:

229

Prior Year Audit Workpaper:

230

Credit Reports

231

232

233

234
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235

Study 2 IRB Approval

236

Study 3 IRB Approval
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